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Abstract: 
 
This thesis contests the assumption that Herbert Evatt’s 1940’s career was devoted to 
the promotion of a universal post-war human rights regime. As Australian Minister 
for External Affairs, Evatt developed an independent small state strategy that pursued 
a system of international democracy and social justice to facilitate the expansion of 
Australian influence in the Pacific and curb American hegemony. Evatt’s subscription 
to the White Australia Policy undermined the realization of human rights by 
strengthening domestic sovereignty against international intervention. Human rights 
became the vehicle through which Evatt sought to shape the post-war order for the 
benefit of Australian national interests. 
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Introduction: 
Recent histories of the 1940’s consider the post-war human rights regime to be a 
vision of utopia constructed by war-wearied statesmen and women. 1  The 
characterization of this period as a utopian moment is useful for two reasons. First, 
that it effectively encapsulates the climate of the 1940’s reconstructive effort and the 
desire for a new world order born out of the ashes of war and crisis.2 Second, that 
despite envisaging a world unlike their own, the human rights activists of this period 
were unavoidably defined by the permeating influence of their historical and political 
context. These two contradictory elements form a utopian discourse that, in the words 
of Jay Winter, ‘inevitably shows where they are, even as it describes where they want 
to be.’3 
 
This tension within the utopian discourse makes the study of individuals highly 
valuable to reflections on the 1940’s human rights moment. More so than any text, 
event or institution, the men and women who left the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as their legacy embodied the utopian vision 
                                                
1 Jay Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom (London: Yale University Press, 2006).   
See also: Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001); Samuel 
Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human 
Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Alan S. 
Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (New York: Routledge, 2000); 
Ken Booth, ‘Three Tyrannies’, in Tim Dunne (with Nicholas J. Wheeler), eds., 
Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in 
East and West (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002); Paul 
Gordon Lauren, ‘First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and 
Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter’, Human 
Rights Quarterly 5, no. 1 (February 1983), pp. 1-26. 
2 Jaime Torres Bodet, ‘UNESCO’, Peace on Earth 1 (1949), pp. 75-76. 
3 Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom, p. 3. 
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for the future defined by the limitations of their present.4 The consideration of these 
actors within their domestic and international contexts offers a unique insight into the 
post-war human rights regime of the 1940’s. One such activist was Herbert Evatt, 
who served as Australian Minister for External Affairs, Attorney General and Labor 
Party leader. Throughout the 1940’s, Evatt notably represented Australia at the San 
Francisco Conference, Paris Peace Conference and Atomic Commission, chaired the 
Committee on Palestine and presided over the third session of the General Assembly. 
Evatt’s influence on the post-war human rights system has earned many admiring 
histories detailing his successes as a champion of internationalism. 
 
Current histories of Herbert Evatt situate him within his domestic context and defend 
his status as a genuine internationalist and human rights activist. Biographies by 
Tennant and Buckley, Dale and Reynolds detail the influence that Evatt’s early life, 
career and Labor controversies had upon his international career.5 Evatt’s colleagues 
Alan Renouf, Paul Hasluck and Allan Dalziel likewise locate Evatt within the specific 
political context of the Ministry of External Affairs and seek to attenuate the claims of 
Evatt’s critics.6 Their admiring reports see Evatt’s radical nonconformity as the cause 
of the criticisms of his colleagues.7 Those who praise Evatt’s nonconformity depict 
him as the champion of the Labor party, defying expectations, forging a radical and 
independent Australian foreign policy and pursuing internationalism and a post-war 
                                                
4 Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom, p. 99. 
5 Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1970). 
See also: Buckley, Ken (with Barbara Dale and Wayne Reynolds), Doc Evatt: patriot, 
internationalist, fighter and scholar (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1994). 
6  Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-1947 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 1980). See also: Allan Dalziel, Evatt the 
Enigma (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967); Alan Renouf, Let Justice Be Done: 
The Foreign Policy of Dr H.V. Evatt (London: University of Queensland Press, 1983). 
7 Dalziel, Evatt the Enigma, p. ix. See also: Ross Fitzgerald (with Stephen Holt), 
‘New Light on Dr Evatt’, The Sydney Institute Quarterly 37 (July 2010), p. 28. 
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system based on universal human rights. Prominent historian W. J. Hudson develops 
this argument, admitting that Evatt pursued an Australian national agenda but 
characterizing him as a ‘constitutionalist [who] pursued positive internationalist 
goals’.8 
 
In addition to these works, a 2008 thesis by Emma Ede considered the discrepancies 
between these accounts and complicated Evatt’s internationalism.9 Ede depicts Evatt 
as an internationalist marred by his devotion to domestic demands.10 Whilst Ede 
considers Evatt a proponent of internationalism, equality and human rights, she 
considers the label of ‘internationalist’ to be misleading, as these were just a few of 
the multiplicity of factors that influenced Evatt’s foreign policy. 11 Her thesis argues 
that Evatt’s commitment to Australian legal heritage, the White Australia policy and 
strategic interests in the Pacific affirmed pre-war ideologies and undermined post-war 
internationalism. 12 Yet Ede subscribes to the common view that Evatt was, to a great 
extent, a genuine internationalist. 
 
These studies make valuable contributions to the interpretation of Evatt’s 
international agenda. However, whilst they note Evatt’s deviations from a professed 
universal human rights agenda, these deviations are either discounted as an 
unavoidable external constraint or as an unfortunate departure from Evatt’s otherwise 
universalist agenda. Renouf considers Evatt’s enduring support for the White 
                                                
8 W. J. Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945 
(Canberra: The Australian Foreign Policy Publications Programme, 1993), p. 7. 
9 Ede, Emma, Internationalist Vision for a Postwar World: H.V. Evatt, Politics & the 
Law, Unpublished Honours Thesis, University of Sydney, 2008. 
10 Ede, Internationalist Vision for a Postwar World, p. 74. 
11 Ede, Internationalist Vision for a Postwar World, p. 74. 
12 Ede, Internationalist Vision for a Postwar World, p. 74. 
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Australia Policy to be an unfortunate exception to his liberalism and promotion of 
universal human rights, largely influenced by his domestic context and upbringing.13 
Tennant explains Evatt’s support for the White Australia Policy as the product of his 
enduring commitment to the Labor Party and its economic agenda, whilst asserting 
his genuine promotion of international human rights.14 Even Ede, whose thesis is 
devoted to the consideration of how Evatt’s domestic commitments undermined his 
internationalism, presents Evatt as a genuine internationalist constrained by a 
domestic agenda. 15 
 
It is in the interpretation of Evatt’s deviations from a universal human rights agenda 
that my work differs from previous histories of Evatt. Considering Evatt in the light of 
both his domestic and international context and the current historical debates over the 
1940’s human rights moment, I would argue not that Evatt was an internationalist 
marred by unfortunate domestic commitments, but that Evatt was a defender of the 
nation-state who used international human rights as a vehicle for the realisation of his 
national agenda. Admiring accounts of Evatt’s career depict him as a genuine 
proponent of internationalism and universalism, hindered by the influence of his 
context and his domestic commitments.16 A more critical approach however, is to 
consider Evatt’s commitment to the nation-state as the defining factor that shaped his 
international agenda.  
 
When one considers Evatt’s deviations from a universal human rights agenda in the 
context of post-war reconstructive efforts, the way in which Evatt’s pursuit of a 
                                                
13 Renouf, Let Justice Be Done, pp. 8-9. 
14 Tennant, Evatt, p. 58. 
15 Ede, Internationalist Vision for a Postwar World, p. 5. 
16 Consider Tennant, Renouf and Ede discussed previously. 
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national project directed his human rights agenda is clear. It is from this position that 
new light can be shed not only on Evatt’s deviations from, but also his proposals for a 
human rights regime in the post-war international system. Both his successes and 
failures as a human rights activist can be understood as the product of a national 
agenda seeking to further Australian interests abroad. Evatt’s national projects can 
thus be considered as the unifying ideology and agenda of his career in the 1940’s, 
rather than the unfortunate exceptions to his internationalism and human rights 
advocacy.  
 
A critical interpretation of Herbert Evatt’s international career also contributes to the 
current historical debate over the validity of the 1940’s human rights moment. 
Traditionally, the 1940’s have been considered to be the seminal moment of the 
international human rights movement. The creation of the United Nations, the 
codification of universal rights and the professed statements of internationalism and 
universalism embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seemingly 
attest to this.17 Historians such as Paul Gordon Lauren, Jay Winter and Mary Ann 
Glendon offer such favourable interpretations of the 1940’s human rights moment. 
Recent histories have challenged this view. Rather than considering the United 
Nations to be a break away from imperial history and pre-existing structures, Mark 
Mazower considers it to be a reinvention of the League of Nations and defined by 
great state imperialism.18 Samuel Moyn likewise argues that many of the movements 
                                                
17 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Justice and Human Rights: Reflections on the Address of 
Pope Benedict to the UN’, The European Journal of International Law 19, no.5 
(2008), p. 925. See also: Mary Ann Glendon, ‘The Rule of Law in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
2 (Spring 2004), p. 2. 
18 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 8. 
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that have been accredited with being a human rights cause - anticolonialism in 
particular - were in fact independent from and in tension with the universal human 
rights scheme.19 Moyn considers the 1970’s to be the moment when human rights 
emerged as the sole survivor of shipwrecked utopian visions.20  
 
Critical to this debate are the intentions and motivations of the human rights activists 
who shaped the post-war system. Whereas Lauren and Glendon offer an admiring 
portrait of the men and women who crafted the Universal Declaration and the United 
Nations, Moyn and Mazower critically examine the continuities and inconsistencies 
of their agendas. It is in this regard that an examination of Evatt’s career is of value. 
As a key activist throughout the war, at the San Francisco Conference and in the early 
years of the United Nations, Evatt had a profound influence on the post-war human 
rights system. The conclusion of this thesis, that Evatt used the human rights 
movement to pursue his national agenda, therefore attests to the critical view of the 
1940’s human rights moment as the continuation of older structures and ideas. Evatt’s 
activism in the 1940’s was directed by his pre-existing national agenda. This agenda 
informed how Evatt manipulated the reconstruction of the post-war system. Evatt 
therefore offers an example of how the utopian visions proposed in this period were 
often motivated and limited by pre-existing national concerns. 
 
Rather than presenting a chronological study of Evatt’s career, this thesis will 
examine the three central areas of Evatt’s foreign policy in the 1940’s: his small state 
strategy, his promotion of social justice and his involvement in the White Australia 
Policy. By considering each of these, the way in which Evatt’s pursuit of national 
                                                
19 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p. 84. 
20 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p. 122. 
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projects shaped his engagement with the international human rights movement 
becomes clear. The first chapter examines the broad lines of Evatt’s international 
policy in the 1940’s, the development of a small state strategy. Evatt’s foreign policy 
during the 1940’s was shaped by the changing nature of international relations.21 The 
Second World War accelerated the collapse of the traditional imperial order as the 
European states struggled to maintain the international war effort. 22  This 
destabilization also contributed to the expansion of the Third World and anticolonial 
political consciousness.23  
 
The earlier imperial world order was therefore transformed into two conflicting 
blocs.24 The first was that of the United States and the old imperial European states. 
These states sought to reinvent League of Nations into a post-war institution that 
would protect their dominance in the world system.25 The second was that of the 
anticolonial movement that sought to circumvent Great State politics.26 These post-
colonial states sought self-determination and universal equity. 27 Whilst both 
                                                
21  Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, ‘Genealogies of Human Rights’, in Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffman, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), p. 13. 
22 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 14. See also: Mark Mazower ‘The Strange 
Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950*’, The Historical Journal 47, no.2 (2004), p. 
389; Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 183. 
23 Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p. 4. See also: Andreas 
Eckhert, ‘African Nationalists and Human Rights, 1940s-1970s’, in Hoffman, Human 
Rights in the Twentieth Century, pp. 283-284. 
24 Herbert Evatt, Task of Nations (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 3. 
25 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 14. See also: Mazower ‘The Strange Triumph 
of Human Rights, 1933-1950*’, p. 389. 
26 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, p. 4. 
27 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, ‘International Regimes for Human Rights’, Annual 
Review of Political Science 15 (June 2012), p. 268. See also; Austin Sarat (with 
Thomas R. Kearns), eds., Human Rights: Concepts, Contests, Contingencies 
(Michigan: University of Michigan, 2001), p. 97. 
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movements acted within the framework of the nation-state (and therefore, as Moyn 
critiques, failed to achieve a universalist human rights regime) Evatt’s engagement 
with their agendas reveals a subscription to neither bloc and instead the pursuit of 
Australian interests.28 Evatt balanced allegiance to both blocs by fostering a strong 
connection to the old and transformed imperial states whilst simultaneously 
constructing Australia as the leader of the small states in the post-war system.29 Evatt 
achieved this through the strong promotion of regionalism based on the model of the 
Australian-New Zealand Pact.30 At San Francisco, Evatt’s policy shifted following his 
failure to secure an Australian position on the Security Council.31  Following this 
rejection Evatt sought to diminish the powers of the Security Council and develop the 
reach of the General Assembly.32 This pursuit of an international democratic forum 
was demonstrably not a pursuit of human rights, but of a system that would offer the 
most benefit to Australian foreign affairs.  
 
The second chapter considers further how Evatt balanced his allegiances with the 
imperial and anticolonial blocs. A central element of Evatt’s international agenda was 
the pursuit of social justice.33 Whilst this policy contributed to the development of 
technical systems that benefited the human rights movement, Evatt’s motivations 
                                                
28 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p. 86. 
29 Wayne Reynolds, ‘Dr H.V. Evatt: Foreign Minister for a Small Power’, in David 
Day, ed., Brave New World: Dr H. V. Evatt and Australian Foreign Policy 1941-1949 
(St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1996), p.150. 
30 H.V. Evatt, ‘Australia’s Approach to Security in the Pacific’, in Regionalism and 
Security (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 14. 
31 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, pp. 249-250. See also: Buckley, Doc Evatt, p. 305. 
32 Renouf, Let Justice Be Done, p.220. 
33 Ashley Hogan, Moving in the Open Daylight, Doc Evatt, an Australian at the 
United Nations (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2008), p. 41. 
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were the betterment of Australia’s position in the world. 34Evatt’s pursuit of social 
justice concerns in international fora was largely shaped by his anxieties over the 
Australian-American diplomatic relationship.35 The Second World War crippled the 
European imperial regimes and left the United States poised as an economic and 
political superpower.36  The Australian government under Prime Minister Curtin 
recognized this shift and sought to foster strong connections to the United States.37  
 
The Australian-American relationship in the 1940’s was disturbed by the traditional 
British and Australian preferential economic system.38 U.S proposals for post-war 
economic reconstruction therefore sought to mitigate such vestiges of colonialism.39 
Evatt spent much of his early career as Minister for External Affairs developing 
Australia’s relationship with the United States.40 He encouraged the U.S statesmen 
and public to consider the commonalities between their two countries and to consider 
                                                
34Evatt discusses these successes in: Herbert V. Evatt, ‘The World’s Most Powerful 
Influence For Peace’, United Nations Bulletin 6, no. 2 (1949), pp. 2-3. 
35 Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of 
International Relations 1941-1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 68. 
36 Buckley, Doc Evatt, p. 187. 
37 Hudson, Australia and the New World Order, p. 14. See also: Alan Watt, The 
Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy: 1938-1965 (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967), p. 65; Herbert Evatt, ‘Australia’s Danger and the Organization of Allied 
Resources: Speech at the Overseas Writers’ Club at the Hotel Willard, Washington, 
28 March 1942’, in Herbert Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia: Speeches (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson Ltd, 1945), p. 50; Herbert Evatt, ‘Australian-American Co-
Operation: Broadcast by Dr Evatt on Mutual Broadcasting System Network, New 
York 5 April 1942’, in Foreign Policy of Australia, p. 52. 
38 Buckley, Doc Evatt, pp. 186-187. See also: Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States, pp. 68, 71; Roger White (with Bethany Tadesse), ‘Immigration Policy, 
Cultural Pluralism and Trade: Evidence from the White Australia Policy’, Pacific 
Economic Review 12, no. 4 (2007), p. 490. 
39 Buckley, Doc Evatt, pp. 186-187. 
40 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 60. See also: Watt, The Evolution of Australian 
Foreign Policy, p. 62. 
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Australia a vital ally.41 This involved the adoption of the Rooseveltian language that 
conflated the languages of democracy and human rights.42  
 
Whilst Evatt sought to develop the Australian-American relationship, his work at San 
Francisco demonstrated his personal vision of a post-war economic order. Evatt 
viewed economic instability and unemployment as the central factors contributing to 
the outbreak of war in Europe.43 Recognising the international nature of world affairs, 
Evatt encouraged his contemporaries to make the pursuit of full employment and 
social justice a central element of the post-war institution.44 This policy was based on 
Australian domestic policies and sought to impose such policies on the international 
system, whilst curbing U.S dominance in the both politics and economics.45 This 
pursuit manifested in the expansion of the Economic and Social Council and the 
inclusion of a full employment agenda.46  
 
Evatt’s attempts to protect Australian security and extend the reach of Australian 
policies were also expressed through the trusteeship system. 47  Evatt sought to 
alleviate threats in the Pacific by encouraging the pursuit of strong economic policies 
                                                
41 Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, p. 67. 
42  Emmanuelle Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 218-219. See also: John Keane, The Life and 
Death of Democracy (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 735; Neville Meaney, 
Australia and the World: A Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985), p. 3. 
43 Glendon, A World Made New, p. 14. 
44 ‘Economic Foundations for Peace: H.V. Evatt’s Address to the International Centre 
15 May 1945’, in H.V. Evatt, Australia in World Affairs (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1946), p.37. 
45 Buckley, Doc Evatt, p. 187. See also: Andrew Byrnes (with Hillary Charlesworth 
and Gabriel McKinnon), Bill of Rights in Australia: history, politics and law (Sydney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2009), p.27. 
46 Evatt, Task of Nations, pp. 212-213. See also: Herbert V. Evatt, The United Nations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1948), p. 31. 
47 Evatt, ‘The Future Peace and Stability of the Pacific’, in Foreign Policy, p. 117. 
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in the Australian trust territories of Papua and New Guinea.48 This policy sought to 
avoid the upheaval that had been experience in Indonesia by stabilizing the region and 
avoiding colonial disputes.49 Evatt’s challenge to the political post-war vision can be 
considered as a national agenda in the guise of universalism. Whilst Evatt’s policies 
seemingly supported a human rights regime, Australian interests motivated them. 
Recognising that Australia could not oppose the power of a hegemonic United States, 
Evatt defended a system within which Australian power was amplified and U.S 
dominance diluted. Thus social justice became the vehicle through which Evatt 
ensured Australian security and the expansion of influence. 
 
The third chapter examines the greatest contradiction of Evatt’s professed human 
rights vision, namely the tensions between domestic jurisdiction, national sovereignty 
and international responsibility. Throughout his career Evatt remained a staunch 
defender of the White Australia Policy. 50   This policy was shaped by the 
transformation of imperialism and the development of the Australian racial ideology 
and immigration policies in the 1940’s.51 As a Dominion state Australia inherited the 
British imperial racial ideology of biological superiority.52 Yet by the 1940’s the 
                                                
48 W. J. Hudson, ed., Australia and Papua New Guinea (Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 1971), p. 146. 
49  Evatt, Task of Nations, p. 199. See also: L. Barria (with S. Roper), The 
Development of Institutions of Human Rights (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010), p. 165. 
50 Renouf, Let Justice Be Done, p. 101. 
51  Laksiri Jayasuriya, The Australian-Asian Connection: Retrospect & Prospect 
(Sydney: H.V. Evatt Research Centre, 1988), p. 7. 
52 Stuart Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The demise of the imperial ideal 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001), p. 7. See also: Philip Ehrensaft (with 
Warwick Armstrong), ‘Dominion Capitalism: A First Statement’, Journal of 
Sociology 14, no.3 (October 1978), p. 352; David Theo Goldberg, ‘Heterogeneity and 
Hybridity: Colonial Legacy, Postcolonial Heresy’, in Henry Schwartz (with Sangeeta 
Ray), eds., A Companion to Postcolonial Studies (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2005), p.79; Jayasuriya, The Australian-Asian Connection, p. 7. 
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Australian racial discourse had evolved towards a socio-economic focus fearful of the 
implications of non-white immigration on white Australian jobs.53 Evatt and his 
contemporaries considered racial homogeneity to be a prerequisite to economic and 
political security.54 The threat of the ‘Yellow Peril’ therefore emphasized Australian 
racist policies against immigration.55  
 
Evatt’s attempts to protect the White Australia Policy were evident at the San 
Francisco Conference and in two precedent-making decisions in the following years. 
At San Francisco, Evatt contributed to the drafting of Articles 2 (7) and 73 of the UN 
Charter, ensuring the protection of national sovereignty. He opposed proposals to 
weaken domestic jurisdiction and ensured that domestic immigration policies were 
made exempt from any international scrutiny.56 Furthermore his continual support for 
South African claims that the apartheid regime was excused from international 
scrutiny as it was a domestic affair, and his abstaining vote on the Ad-Hoc Committee 
into Palestine demonstrated the threat that a precedent of international intervention 
                                                
53 Jeremy Sammut, ‘The Long Demise of the White Australia Policy’, Quadrant 
(November 2005), p.34. See also: Downs, The Australian Trusteeship Papua New 
Guinea 1945-1975 75 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980), 
pp. 4-5; Tennant, Evatt, p. 58; Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 35. 
54 With regards to political security, Evatt saw the preservation of Australia’s white 
majority as crucial to ensuring domestic security. Internationally, however, he 
recognized the impossibilities of ensuring racial homogeneity and thus promoted the 
necessity of spreading western democratic systems in the Asian-Pacific. See: H.V. 
Evatt, ‘Policy Speech of the Australian Labor Party’, The Parliament of the  
Commonwealth Elections, November 22, 1958, October 15, 1958, p. 24. See also: 
Renouf, Let Justice Be Done, p. 9; Herbert Vere Evatt, “Japan is Still a Menace’, New 
York Times, Feb 3, 1946, p. 6; ‘Introduction by the Rt. Hon. H. V. Evatt’, in John 
Burton, The Light Glows Brighter (Glebe: Liberty Press, 1956), p. 5. 
55 Keith Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2004), p. 
271. 
56 Daniel Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel: The Undercover Zionist 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), p. 98. See also: Buckley, Doc Evatt, p. 100. 
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would cause.57 Thus despite allegations of human rights violations in both of these 
cases, Evatt’s national agenda undermined his professed human rights convictions. 
Evatt’s defense of the White Australia Policy vividly demonstrates how his 
international agenda was shaped by Australian national interests rather than a 
subscription to universal human rights. 
                                                
57 Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel, p. 100. See also: Buckley, Doc 
Evatt, p. 100. 
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Chapter One: Evatt’s small state strategy 
Contemporary histories of Evatt credit him with leading Australia towards an 
independent foreign policy based on small state relations, regionalism and the 
challenging of U.S and European hegemony at the United Nations.58 Evatt has 
become infamous for his attempts to mitigate the Security Council veto, his 
representation of the interests of Australia and the Pacific region and his expansion of 
the Australian Ministry of External Affairs.59 This was largely achieved by Evatt’s 
petitioning to form the United Nations into an international democratic forum, for 
which many have considered him to be a human rights activist. Within the context of 
the Australian domestic situation such an assessment is understandable. The Ministry 
of External Affairs was a subsidiary colonial office until Evatt was appointed Minister 
in 1941.60 Australian foreign policy had largely been conducted at the demands of the 
British Home Office and was centered on the war in Europe.61 Evatt’s radical 
approach to foreign policy altered this, forging an independent and extensive 
                                                
58 Renouf, Let Justice Be Done, pp. 220-221. See also: Dalziel, Evatt the Enigma, pp. 
iv-x; Scott Guy, ‘Herbert Vere Evatt: Jurist, Politician, Person- The Paradox’, Bond 
Law Review 21, no.1 (January 2009), p.4; Andrew Campbell, ‘Dr. H. V. Evatt- Part 
One: A Question of Sanity’, National Observer 73 (Winter 2007), p.27; Dalziel, Evatt 
the Enigma (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967); Tennant, Evatt, p. 11; Hasluck, 
Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-1947; Hogan, Moving in the 
Open Daylight, p. 9; Hudson, Australia and the New World Order, pp.7-8; Christine 
De Matos, ‘Diplomacy Interrupted?: Macmahon Ball, Evatt and Labor’s Policies in 
Occupied Japan’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 52, no.2 (2006), p. 193. 
59 Joan Beaumont (with David Lowe, Christopher Waters and Garry Woodard), 
Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making 1941-1969 
(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2003), p. 20. 
60 Beaumont, Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats, p. 1. See also: Hudson, Australia 
and the New World Order, p. 15; Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 
p.61. 
61 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 7. See also: Beaumont, Ministers, Mandarins and 
Diplomats, p. 2. 
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diplomatic system that challenged the great imperial states to consider the 
contribution of smaller states.62  
 
When this policy is situated within the broader international context of ‘competing 
universalisms’, an alternative interpretation of Evatt’s agenda can be considered.63 
The Second World War saw the transformation of the traditional imperial system into 
two competing blocs.64 Increasingly, European imperialism became ideologically and 
economically unsustainable. 65  The great European states therefore sought to 
reconstruct their flailing empires in a post-war system that would retain their 
international influence and power.66 This agenda conflicted with that of the growing 
anticolonial movement. Post-colonial states encouraged the creation of a post-war 
system that offered increased opportunities for small states.67 These states envisaged a 
post-war system of self-determination and increased international decolonization.68  
 
To a middle Dominion state such as Australia, the forging of a new foreign policy 
agenda in this context was fraught with difficulty, as it required concessions from 
either party.69 Evatt’s approach to the complexities of diplomacy in the 1940’s was to 
balance the conservation of Australia’s traditional colonial ties with Britain and its 
                                                
62 Reynolds, ‘Dr H.V. Evatt’, p.150. See also: Guy, ‘Herbert Vere Evatt’, p. 33; 
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developing relationship with the United States with its leadership of small states in the 
international community.70 Admiring histories of Evatt consider his development of a 
small state strategy for Australia to be the expression of his human rights agenda.71 
Such appraisals of Evatt however, fail to consider the widespread criticisms of his San 
Francisco activities and fluctuations in his agenda. They also fail to grapple with 
allegations that anticolonialism and the growth of the small state movement was not a 
universal human rights movement but rather a continuation of state-based politics.72 A 
closer examination of Evatt’s small state strategy reveals the pervasive influence that 
his relentless pursuit of Australian interests and national projects had on the 
development of a small state strategy. Evatt recognized that Australian interests could 
best be served by promoting an international system based on universal democracy 
and the encouragement of strong state creation.73 It was only within such a system 
that Australia could grow its subordinate role as a Dominion state. For this reason, he 
encouraged a small state strategy for Australia and represented the small state 
movement within the international community. 
 
The three defining features of Evatt’s small state strategy were his forging of an 
independent Australian foreign policy, his promotion of regionalism in the Australia-
New Zealand Pact and his vision of an international democratic forum pursued at San 
Francisco. In each of these cases, Evatt took advantage of the weakening of the 
imperial system by seeking to establish Australia as the leading power in the Pacific.74 
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After failing to secure a position on the Security Council and thus elevate Australia to 
the table of the Great States, Evatt vehemently opposed the veto and pursued a small 
state strategy that would consolidate the international influence available to a mid-
state like Australia.75 In short, when Australia was denied entry to the level of the 
imperial, Evatt pursued a world system within which Australia could exercise 
considerable influence: an international democratic forum.76 His policy in the 1940’s 
was therefore defined by his attempts to curb Great State power, secure Australian 
international interests and develop a strong sense of Australian leadership in the 
Pacific region. This chapter will examine this by considering the three central 
elements of Evatt’s agenda, as well as the current debate over imperialism and 
anticolonialism in the fledgling United Nations organisation. 
 
The development of an independent Australian foreign policy 
The 1940’s were a caesura both in the international system and in Australian foreign 
policy. For the international community, the war destabilized the imperial system and 
accelerated the growth of the anticolonial movement.77 For the Australian domestic 
situation, the war demanded the development of a Pacific strategy and separation 
from the British imperial agenda. 78  Within this context, Evatt’s pursuit of an 
independent Australian foreign policy based on regionalism and a small state strategy 
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reveals his subscription to the Australian national agenda at the cost of human rights 
universalism. Particularly at the San Francisco Conference, Evatt strategically 
selected the movements with which Australia would ally, depending on the influence 
that they could offer in the post-war system. This pursuit of a system within which 
Australian influence would increase often sacrificed the realization of universal 
human rights. Therefore, whilst Evatt’s diplomacy in the 1940’s has puzzled many 
due to its seemingly disjointed and convoluted form, it can be cohesively and 
holistically understood as the vehement pursuit of Australian national interests at the 
cost of alternative post-war international visions.79 
 
The development of an independent Australian foreign policy involved balancing 
commitments to imperialism and anticolonialism. Such an agenda appeared to 
contradict the pursuit of independence, as it involved the consolidation of ties to 
Britain and the development of new relations with the United States.80 However, in a 
world climate that was continually reinventing and reinterpreting imperialism, Evatt 
recognized that the maintenance of these connections was of crucial concern.81 This 
agenda was pursued within the broader framework of extending Australian post-war 
powers and influence.82 Recognising the likelihood of a post-war world dominated by 
the United States, Evatt sought strongly to develop the Australian-American 
diplomatic relationship whilst consolidating colonial ties to Britain.83 This was largely 
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expressed through Evatt’s diplomatic tours of the United States and representation of 
Australia at meeting such as the Pacific War Council.84 In a promotional magazine 
published in New York, 1942, Evatt encouraged Americans to consider the 
similarities between their cultures and systems of government. He wrote:  
Australia’s machinery of government stands midway between that of Britain 
and that of the United States. We are linked to Britain not only by allegiance 
to the King and the ties of kinship, but by our adoption of the British system of 
“responsible government”…Side by side with this essentially British system, 
Australia established a federal system of government largely on the United 
States model.85 
 
Throughout the war effort, Evatt led the Ministry of External Affairs in balancing 
‘multilateral diplomacy’ with the pursuit of independence.86 Whilst at the outbreak of 
war the Ministry had been merely a ‘small and relatively powerless section of the 
Commonwealth bureaucracy’, Evatt encouraged the posting of independent 
Australian representatives to Washington, Tokyo and Ottawa, the growth of the office 
through the diplomatic cadet scheme and the expansion of the Ministry’s staff and 
responsibilities.87 This allowed the Ministry to distance itself from the London Home 
Office and forge an independent path for the war, a fact that Evatt explicitly noted in a 
speech to the House of Representatives in 1943. He stated: 
The field of Australian external affairs has extended and is extending very 
rapidly…As more and more questions of post-war international reorganization 
arise…the need for specially trained staff will increase even further…I have 
enough confidence in the youth of Australia to believe that we can raise a 
first-class corps of trained Australian diplomats capable and eager to serve 
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their country, and always mindful of its interests wherever in the world they 
may be posted.88  
 
Evatt reinforced the need for an independent policy, and sought to ensure that 
Australia’s wartime commitment did not go unrecongised in the development of the 
post-war system.89 
 
The second element of Evatt’s pursuit of Australian independence was the fostering 
of relations with the growing anticolonial movement by establishing Australia as an 
international leader of small states.90 This manifested in the development of Pacific 
regionalism, the encouragement of regional systems of security and in Evatt’s 
attempts to curb great state powers in the post-war United Nations institution.91 The 
development of Pacific regionalism was a crucial factor in mobilizing the Asian-
Pacific anticolonial movement towards achieving an international political presence.92 
Evatt’s forging of a Pacific regional system based on collective security strengthened 
the position of anticolonial states whilst reinforcing Australia’s position as a regional 
security power.93 This model then formed the basis for Evatt’s proposals at the San 
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Francisco Conference for the development of widespread regionalisms and strong 
regional security systems.94 
 
The necessity of a Pacific system of regional security became increasingly clear 
throughout the war effort. Prime Minister Curtin, in his New Years message in 1942, 
spoke retrospectively of the difficulties of Japanese hostilities experienced in the 
Pacific in the previous year. He considered the conflict to be the ‘proper fate of any 
country which did not build its own defences… [and] was also the proper fate for a 
country  that thought it could fight anybody’s war before it made its own position 
safe.’95 Curtin’s comments highlighted the ever-growing reality that the war in the 
Pacific demanded a response independent of the war in Europe.96 In recognition of 
this, Evatt pursued a geographically appropriate wartime and post-war strategy. 97 He 
wrote: 
The Australian approach to the problem of post-war security is very largely 
determined by its geographical position in the Pacific area…Inevitably… 
Australia has a direct and vital concern in conditions which will ensure 
political stability, economic and social progress and peaceful co-operation 
between the peoples of South-west Asia and the South Pacific generally and 
the Western nations at present having authority over them.98  
 
Evatt’s wartime policy therefore sought to establish strong international regionalisms 
that protected Australia from Pacific threats without relying on military protection 
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from the far-off allies of Britain or the United States.99 This policy was exemplified in 
the Australia-New Zealand Agreement of 1944, which Evatt considered to be ‘one of 
the pivots of [Australian] external policy’.100  Precipitated by the unprecedented 
spread of the war to the Pacific and the threat of Pacific invasion, the Agreement 
recognized the common interests of both nations and promised increased cooperation 
in managing the region.101 Section 13 of the Pact read: ‘The two Governments agree 
that, within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of 
defense comprising the South West and South Pacific areas shall be established and 
that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand…’102  
 
Largely shaped in reaction to Japanese involvement in the Pacific, this Pact solidified 
the Australia-New Zealand alliance against foreign aggressors. 103As the Pacific 
became a front of increasing strategic value, the protection of the region became a 
critical concern for the two British Dominions who professed leadership over the 
smaller South Pacific states. Evatt recognized this in his statements regarding the 
Japanese Peace Settlement, ‘It is undeniable that the future of Australia and New 
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Zealand must be affected by the ultimate disposition of Japanese occupied territory. 
The decisions which will be made on this matter at the Pacific Peace Settlement will 
vitally affect the future security of these two countries.’104   
 
Evatt’s agenda at San Francisco 
Evatt’s post-war vision for an international system allowing for the expansion of 
Australian interests was made vividly clear during his negotiations at the San 
Francisco Conference. Evatt acted tirelessly during this conference to mold post-war 
institutions to the benefit of Australian national projects. His promotion of 
regionalism was clearly expressed in negotiations over the wording of the Charter. 
Evatt sought to protect the authority of regionalism in the regional self-defense clause 
of Section C, Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks draft. Whilst the draft did afford 
some power over regional disputes to regional agencies, it demanded that the Security 
Council oversee such procedures and that enforcement action required Security 
Council authorization.105  
 
Evatt considered such a proposal to be the assertion of Security Council hegemony 
over the pursuit of collective security.106 The Australian delegation therefore proposed 
an amendment to the draft that protected collective security against matters becoming 
‘frozen’ by a Security Council disagreement.107 This amendment was then translated 
into Article 51 of the Charter, which read: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
                                                
104 H.V. Evatt, Japanese Peace Settlement: Statements by Australian Minister for 
External Affairs, the Rt. Hon. H.V. Evatt, M.P. (Canberra: Department of External 
Affairs, 1947), p.9. 
105 Evatt, The United Nations, pp.26-27. 
106 Evatt, The United Nations, p.27. 
107 Evatt, The United Nations, p. 10. 
 28 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…’108  
 
Evatt’s pursuit of regionalism strengthened Australia’s position as a leading power in 
the Pacific whilst protecting it against a threat undeterred by either Great Britain or 
the United States.109 Recognising the significance of Australia’s regionalism in the 
Pacific to the war effort, Evatt sought to construct the post-war order in such a way as 
to protect its right to engage in self-defense before requiring authorization from the 
Security Council. Evatt also used this regionalism as a strategy to promote Australian 
influences after the war, establishing itself as an industrial and military leader of the 
disparate Pacific nations. 110  Furthermore, Evatt’s petitioning at San Francisco 
afforded the opportunity for independent self-defensive action to all states, 
encouraging the development of Third World and small state regionalisms across the 
globe.111 This action fostered the process of decolonization and the strengthening of 
post-colonial international system whilst protecting Australia behind ‘an Anglo-
American security screen.’112 
 
Evatt’s negotiations at San Francisco crystalized the way in which his fluctuating 
commitments to imperialism and anticolonialism and the human rights movement 
were secondary to the pursuit of Australian interests. In his support of the anticolonial 
movement Evatt sought to curb great state powers by challenging the veto of the 
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Security Council and bolstering the powers of the General Assembly. 113 However this 
policy was only adopted after Australia had been refused a position on the Security 
Council, forcing Evatt to turn from his imperial to anticolonial allies in order to 
enhance Australia’s post-war influence.114 Evatt’s commitment to either movement 
was therefore of secondary concern to the betterment of the Australian post-war 
situation. Such fluctuations in his policies also undermine the interpretation of his San 
Francisco agenda as the pursuit of a universal human rights regime, as a system of 
international democracy was ostensibly Evatt’s secondary option. 
 
Despite Evatt’s attempts to elevate the extent Australian power and influence in the 
post-war world, it was clear in post-war negotiations that Australia could not be 
considered a great state of the likes of Great Britain or the United States.  Evatt was 
therefore forced to reconstruct his approach to the pursuit Australian interests at San 
Francisco. Drawing on the Canadian model, Evatt presented Australia as a ‘Middle 
Power’, balancing alliances to both the great and the small states.115 It was due to this 
status, and Australia’s situation as the ‘Principal Power’ in the Pacific that Evatt 
argued for Australian representation on the Security Council.116 Evatt sought to use 
Australia’s Pacific influence to develop both its primacy over the small nations in the 
region and its power in the United Nations organisation.117 After Australia was denied 
entry onto the Security Council however, Evatt’s policy radically shifted. Whilst he 
had first sought to uphold the pseudo-imperial institution by seeking to participate, 
Australia’s rejection caused Evatt to champion a small state movement against the 
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unchecked power of the Security Council.118 Were he to be successful, Evatt would 
see a post-war system based on international democracy that afforded majority to the 
small state movement that Australia led.119  
 
Following the rejection of Australia from the Security Council, Evatt’s policy was to 
vehemently oppose the provision of the veto.120 Despite strong opposition from the 
Great States, Evatt secured twenty votes against the veto of the fifty nations 
present.121 Whilst the fulfillment of his aim was almost impossible to achieve, it 
required direct intervention from President Truman and the expression of the non-
negotiable nature of the veto for the opposition to subside.122 In light of his failure to 
completely remove the veto clause, Evatt then sought to ‘chip away’ at its provisions 
for Great State power over the decisions of the United Nations.123 The position of the 
Australian delegation at San Francisco was described by Evatt as being ‘between the 
two extremes of total support for and total opposition to the veto.’124 Tempering his 
original position, Evatt settled on the conclusion that it was ‘reasonable to allow the 
great powers to exercise an individual veto where enforcement measures are 
involved.’125  
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His contention however, was the unchecked authority of the Security Council over 
matters not related to international peace and security on a mass scale.126 Led by 
Australia, a number of small states petitioned the Great States to alter the language of 
the Charter and restrict the allowances for the imposition of the veto.127 Despite being 
informed that, in Evatt’s words, ‘no change in the text would be accepted and that we 
would have to take the Charter with this text or have no world organisation at all’, 
some restrictions were afforded in the Charter.128 The main change that resulted from 
the small state petitioning led by Australia was the allowance of free discussion.129 
Namely, that the exercise of the veto was limited to the adoption of decisions and 
could not be used to prevent discussion.130  
 
Evatt’s failure to secure an Australian position on the Security Council led to his 
pursuit of an international system of democracy within which Australian influence 
could develop. This was largely achieved through the expansion of the powers of the 
General Assembly.131 In the original Dumbarton Oaks draft, the mandate of the 
General Assembly was described as the discussion of ‘general principles’ and the 
‘maintenance of international peace and security.’132 To Evatt, such restrictions were 
incompatible with the democratic spirit of the General Assembly and thus he 
petitioned for the removal of such phrases and the allowance for free discussion of all 
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matters.133 In this regard, Evatt’s attempts were much more successful. An Australian 
amendment presented at the San Francisco conference rectified these restrictions. In 
Evatt’s words, this was achieved by giving ‘the Assembly power to discuss all matters 
within the scope of the Charter. Without this change it would not have been possible 
to discuss the eligibility of new members, the use of veto, and many other matters on 
the agenda…as a result of this change the Assembly may gradually become a 
democratic forum in world opinion.’134  
 
Evatt saw the General Assembly as the forum of international democracy wherein 
small states were offered unprecedented opportunities for influence.135 He sought to 
prevent the Assembly from becoming ‘a shield for the strong and a mockery for the 
weak.’136 As discussions in the General Assembly were free from Security Council 
control, the forum gave small, and middle states the possibility of real international 
influence. Within this forum, Australia as the leader of the small state movement 
could exercise its influence over the majority and establish for itself a strong political 
position for the post-war world.137 Whilst on a superficial level Evatt’s support for the 
General Assembly could be viewed as a subscription to international democracy and 
universal human rights, his fluctuating position on the veto reveals his true national 
agenda. Evatt’s first post-war strategy sought to elevate Australia to the table of the 
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Great States at the Security Council.138 When that was denied however, Evatt turned 
to a small state strategy that sought to curb big power politics and increase the scope 
of the General Assembly within which Australia could exercise influence over small 
states. His agenda at San Francisco was therefore shaped by his attempts to pursue 
Australian interests and the betterment of the Australian post-war situation. 
 
A Small State Strategy and Human Rights? 
The conventional interpretation of Evatt’s small state strategy has been that it reveals 
his subscription to an international human rights agenda and to cosmopolitan 
internationalism. However, as I have considered in this chapter, Evatt’s development 
of an independent Australian foreign policy through the promotion of regionalism, 
campaigns to mitigate great state dominance in the United Nations and support of the 
General Assembly were motivated not by a universal human rights agenda but by the 
pursuit of Australian national interests. The unifying logic behind Evatt’s 
international agenda in the 1940’s was not a cosmopolitan human rights commitment 
but an attempt to extend Australian post-war power and influence. This was largely 
achieved by balancing relations with the imperial and anticolonial movements. If one 
considers this diplomacy to be at the center of Evatt’s 1940’s activism, then the 
relationship between imperialism, anticolonialism and human rights is of crucial 
concern. It is in this regard that it is critical to note that neither imperialism nor 
anticolonialism were a human rights movement.  
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When considering the relationship between imperialism and human rights, it is 
seemingly straightforward that there was a discontinuity.139 Imperial visions of a post-
war world were largely fixated upon the protection of power at the expense of a 
system of international equity.140 Despite the liberal civilizing missions that often 
challenged this hegemonic paradigm, the imperial system pursued post-war 
reconstruction based on the continuation of great state dominated politics.141 As the 
traditional imperial world system had become economically and ideologically 
incompatible with demands for the post-war world, the great states sought to 
reconstruct the international system in such a way as to retain their international 
dominance.142 This agenda contributed greatly to the United Nations becoming the 
reinvention of the League of Nations, centralizing power in the Security Council and 
strengthening the nation-state.143 Whilst Evatt challenged the centrality of the Security 
Council, his original attempt to secure an Australian seat demonstrates how his 
opposition to the institution was based on national, rather than international, concerns.  
 
Interpretations of the relationship between the anticolonial movement and the 
international human rights movement have proved more hazardous. Superficially, the 
anticolonial movement seems to support an international human rights regime. The 
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promotion of international equity, the rejection of imperial constraints and the 
emancipation of the oppressed attest to the universalism that forms the core of the 
human rights ideology.144 However the anticolonial movement in the 1940’s pursued 
self-determination at the cost of human rights cosmopolitanism.145 The state-centric 
nature of this pursuit undermined the realization of a universal human rights 
system.146  
 
Self-determination and rights were inherently bound together and became an 
influential ideology during the 1940’s.147 However the notion of a post-colonial 
utopia of self-determination was based upon imperial emancipation rather than 
codified individual rights. 148 Whilst self-determination required the articulation and 
provision of rights, it occurred within a state framework of emancipation rather than a 
universalist framework of individual rights.149 This pursuit was demanded by the 
nature of the post-war international system. The post-war system was formed around 
the preservation of the nation-state.150 Engagement in the United Nations institution 
was granted only to states, and thus non-self-governing territories needed to achieve 
statehood before they could be offered participation in the international forum.151 For 
the United Nations organisation, the anticolonial pursuit of collective self-
determination instead of human rights was crucial.152  
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Despite being undermined in their activism against proposals for the Security Council 
veto, small state petitioning for an international democratic forum in the General 
Assembly was largely successful.153 This organ of the United Nations became the 
expression of the internationalism that defined the post-war era.154 As a democratic 
forum, the General Assembly offered unprecedented power to the Third World and 
small states who banded together on issues such as self-determination and trusteeship, 
forming a strong majority. Yet the agenda of these states was largely focused on these 
issues of self-determination, rather than the pursuit of universal human rights. Self-
determination and the post-colonial movement therefore offered a competing utopia 
against which human rights had to compete.155 Evatt’s pursuit of a small state strategy 
offered no attempt to challenge the self-determination agenda of the Third World, 
instead pledging support for its efforts.  
 
Evatt’s support for anticolonial post-war projects that challenged human rights 
universalism was also evident in the construction of Pacific regionalism.156 The 
Pacific system of welfare, trusteeship and collective security existed within a state-
based framework that sought to strengthen small states. This reinforced the centrality 
of the nation-state to the practice of international relations.157 Such a system also 
challenged the dominance of the European imperial states and the United States by 
encouraging self-determination and establishing Australia a key power-holding 
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Pacific authority.158 Instead of supporting a universal post-war human rights regime, 
Pacific regionalism offered an alternative avenue of self-determination and an 
independent regional system.159 Evatt’s alignment with the anticolonial movement at 
the United Nations and in the construction of Pacific regionalism can therefore be 
seen as evidence of his national agenda overtaking his human rights vision.  
 
If relations with the imperial and anticolonial states defined Evatt’s international 
engagements in the 1940’s, it is therefore impossible to interpret his activism as the 
pursuit of a universal human rights regime. Neither movement sought to achieve 
universal human rights, rather seeking to centralize power or achieve statehood. 
Evatt’s pursuit of an independent Australian foreign policy involved the balancing of 
commitments to each bloc. The development of this small state strategy through 
regionalism, the mitigation of great state hegemony and promotion of international 
democracy was therefore the manifestation of his national agenda, not a subscription 
to a universal human rights regime. 
 
Conclusions: 
Whilst traditional histories of Herbert Evatt present his small strategy as the 
expression of his international human rights agenda, a closer examination reveals the 
formative influence of his domestic agenda. Evatt balanced imperial and anticolonial 
commitments by fostering relationships with the United States and Great Britain and 
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simultaneously pursuing a system of international democracy. These commitments 
were directed by their potential benefit to the Australian post-war position. This 
agenda demonstrates how Australian aspirations, not universal human rights, defined 
his diplomatic actions and small state strategy in the 1940’s.  
 
Evatt’s policies were fundamentally shaped by the multidimensional climate of the 
1940’s, namely the evolution of imperialism and the growth of anticolonialism. The 
Second World War destabilized imperialism and accelerated the growth of 
anticolonialism.160 In order for the imperial European states to retain their dominance, 
they were therefore required to reconfigure the post-war system around human rights, 
not imperial demands. This was challenged by the growing anticolonial movement 
that sought to balance participation and influence over international affairs.161 This 
competing ideological framework provided a crucial context within which Evatt led 
the Australian Ministry of External Affairs. Evatt’s approach during the 1940’s was 
characterized by his attempt to forge an independent Australian foreign policy that 
balanced relationships with Europe, the United States and the post-colonial small 
states.162 Whilst maintaining strong connections to Britain and the United States, 
Evatt bolstered the Ministry of External Affairs, encouraging the development of an 
independent Australian foreign policy and diplomatic representation.163 Evatt also 
highlighted the unique needs and responsibilities of Australia in the Pacific, calling 
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for the development of regional security zones that would establish Australia as a key 
security power independent of greater state authority.164 
 
A central element of the new independent Australian foreign policy was the 
promotion of regionalism and the establishment of Australia as a leading nation in the 
South Pacific. 165  The Australia-New Zealand Pact of 1944 demonstrated this 
movement, establishing a regional security zone with Australia and New Zealand as 
the security states in the Pacific. 166This policy strengthened Australia’s ties to the 
surrounding small states and offered considerable influence in the South Pacific 
region.167 The complexities of balancing a myriad of connections became clear at the 
San Francisco Conference, as Evatt first and foremost sought to elevate Australia’s 
international standing. Despite his small state strategy, Evatt attempted to negotiate a 
position for Australia on the Security Council.168 When that proved unsuccessful, he 
turned to his small state allies to minimize the powers of the Security Council, with 
minimal success.169  
 
Wartime regionalism became a crucial part of Evatt’s activism at the United Nations, 
as he sought to protect the rights of nations to exercise regional self-defense without 
requiring the authorization of the Security Council.170  The Australian delegation also 
succeeded in amending the role of the General Assembly, seeing it as an international 
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forum for democracy and free discussion. 171 It was within this democratic system that 
Australia could most effectively exercise its influence over small states, having been 
denied a position on the Security Council.  
 
In each of these areas, Evatt’s foreign policy in the 1940’s was clearly shaped by 
pursuit of Australian national projects. Rather than pursuing the full realization of the 
cosmopolitan human rights vision, Evatt sacrificed elements of human rights 
universalism in order to enhance Australian interests. During the war Evatt’s 
commitments to the imperial and anticolonial blocs were defined by Australian 
strategic interests. However neither movement sought the realization of a universal 
human rights regime, instead the continuation of state-based politics. His pursuit of 
democracy at the United Nations came only after his aims of establishing Australia 
alongside the imperial nations failed, and primarily sought to extend Australian 
influence rather than assert a human rights regime. Evatt’s support for human rights in 
the 1940’s therefore fell subject to his small state strategy and his pursuit of the 
Australian national agenda in the post-war world. 
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Chapter Two: Internationalising Social Justice 
 
The promotion of social justice in the international community was a critical part of 
Herbert Evatt’s foreign policy agenda in the 1940’s. 172 Informed by his Labor 
ideology and Australian domestic economic policies, Evatt sought to promote 
international economic equity and stability.173 In particular, Evatt promulgated the 
virtues of full employment, the expansion of the Economic and Social Council and 
the economic responsibilities of states under the trusteeship system. 174 Whilst this 
agenda has often been interpreted as the pursuit of international human rights, a 
critical examination reveals the formative influence of Evatt’s anxieties over U.S 
dominance and the Australian national agenda.175 The growth of U.S dominance in 
the world system, both politically and economically, threatened Evatt’s vision of a 
post-war world within which Australian influence could develop.176 Evatt therefore 
adopted a twofold policy, consolidating a strong relationship with the superpower 
whilst advocating a global system that would alleviate its threat.  
 
Largely at the direction of Prime Minister Curtin, Evatt sought to foster a strong 
diplomatic relationship with the United States of America. 177 Evatt then balanced this 
with the promotion of a system of international equity within which small and middle 
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states could influence international economic policies.178 At San Francisco, Evatt 
sought to expand the powers of the Economic and Social Council in an attempt to 
moderate the unchecked dominance of the United States of America. Evatt also 
sought to establish Australia as a policy-influencing nation by imposing its domestic 
economic policies on the international system. This agenda manifested in his 
negotiations over full employment at San Francisco. 179  Finally, Evatt and the 
Australian delegation asserted the responsibilities of trustee states to improve the 
economic and social conditions of non-self-governing territories.180 His promotion of 
an international trusteeship system allowed Australia to encourage strong economic 
and social policies in the surrounding territories of Papua and New Guinea.181 This 
mitigated the risk of instability that had been experienced in Indonesia and established 
Australia as a dominant power in the region.182 
 
From a critical consideration of these policies and of their domestic and international 
contexts, the formative influence of Evatt’s national agenda and anxieties over U.S 
dominance is clear. Rather than seeking a system of social justice for the fulfillment 
of international human rights, Evatt used social justice as the vehicle through which 
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Australian national projects could be realized.183 A system of international social 
justice allowed for the expansion of Australian international influence, both over 
individual territories and policy, whilst moderating the threat of great state hegemony.  
 
Australia and social justice 
Evatt’s international defense of economic and social justice was fundamentally 
shaped by his domestic context. This influence was a crucial factor in informing his 
international agenda. As was characteristic of Labor party policy, the provision of full 
employment and worker’s rights were a central part of the Curtin government 
agenda.184 However with the strains caused by the Great Depression and the interwar 
period, Curtin’s economic policies came to bear even stronger weight as the 
Australian government sought to restabilise the economy. Treasurer turned Minister 
for Postwar Reconstruction J. B. Chifley insisted that economic stability be the central 
policy of Australia’s postwar thinking.185 Chifley considered full employment, social 
security and Australia’s international economic policy to be the three central pillars of 
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postwar reconstruction.186 Evatt was a keen supporter of this policy, both for Australia 
domestically and for adoption internationally.187 This support was largely influenced 
by his extensive experience in trade union and industrial disputes during his early 
career. 188 Commenting in a Sydney Morning Herald article published in 1945, Evatt 
stated: 
Australia’s policy of full employment is based on the fundamental right of 
every man and woman who desires work to obtain such work on reasonable 
conditions. This policy has been basic to the domestic policy of the 
Government during the past three years.  It has, however, not only a local or 
national significance but an international one. It has been shown by experience 
that mass unemployment in countries like Britain and the United States 
produces consequences which almost inevitably cause mass unemployment in 
countries like Australia and New Zealand.189 
 
In 1942 Evatt, as Attorney General, presented the Constitutional Alteration (War 
Aims and Reconstruction) Bill that stated that ‘the power of Parliament shall extend 
to all measures which, in the declared opinion of the Parliament, will tend to achieve 
economic security and social justice.’190 This bill sought to amend the constitution to 
provide for direct federal legislative power over the post-war reconstructive effort 
based on Roosevelt’s four fundamental freedoms.191 Evatt’s bill was never put to a 
referendum due to the war and significant opposition from Parliament. Following 
their landslide victory in the 1943 election, Labor reformed the bill and presented it 
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again in 1944 as a Referendum that was rejected in all states but Western Australia 
and South Australia where it passed by a slim majority.192  
 
The domestic precedent of full employment policies provides a crucial context for 
interpreting Evatt’s international economic agenda. Firstly, it demonstrates the 
permeating influence of Evatt’s staunch Labor ideology. However secondly, and of 
more concern to this thesis, it reveals how Evatt sought to extend Australian 
international influence by establishing Australia as a policy influencing nation in the 
post-war international system. This is of note when one considers the precedent of 
pre-war international relations, where international policies were shaped and executed 
by imperial powers and small and middle state contributions were minimal. 
 
Australian-American relations in the 1940’s 
In addition to this domestic context, Evatt’s actions regarding social justice at the 
United Nations were shaped by the specific nature of Australian-American relations 
in the 1940’s. In particular, Evatt perceived the growth of the United States as a 
political and economic superpower as a factor demanding a shift in the Australian 
diplomatic approach.193 The tradition of relying in Britain for the orientation of 
Australian foreign policy was rapidly becoming unsuitable as the war expanded in the 
Pacific.194 Thus a significant element of the expansion of the Australian Ministry of 
External Affairs was the development of the Australian-American diplomatic 
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relationship. 195  Similarly to his broader approach to international affairs, Evatt 
developed a tandem policy towards the United States.196 On the one hand, he sought 
to foster a strong relationship and sympathy for Australian war efforts. On the other, 
he actively petitioned for a world system that would counter growing U.S economic 
dominance and allow smaller and middle states to experience equal opportunities and 
influence over international policy.197 
 
The complex nature of American-Australian relations during the war was largely 
shaped by the specific economic context of the 1940’s.198 The Australian economic 
policy for international trade consolidated its colonial ties to Great Britain.199 The 
Australian system was based on a tight tariff system that allowed for preferential 
treatment of British goods in return for the preference of Australian exports in Britain 
and the empire.200 The United States opposed this system on the basis that it 
discriminated against nations not included in the Ottawa Trade Agreements of 
1932.201 This objection was largely due to the United States’ economic status in the 
war.202 As the world’s dominant economic power, the United States would benefit 
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from an international economic system of free trade. 203  As such, the United States 
strongly supported proposals for such a system and challenged the lingering colonial 
preferential schemes.204  
 
At the end of the war, the United States was therefore placed as the political and 
economic power holder.205 On the one hand, this reality prompted Curtin to encourage 
the development of a strong relationship with the United States.206 Evatt spent much 
of 1942 mediating economic negotiations between Washington and Canberra, 
attempting to ensure that Australia benefited from any potential economic 
agreement.207 On the other however, this reality caused Evatt to challenge the idea of 
U.S hegemony with the promotion of social and economic equality. Put simply, 
Evatt’s campaign for social justice envisaged a world in which smaller and middle 
states would not be undermined by great states holding dominant economic power. 
Evatt’s vision challenged the vision of a world in which the United States unilaterally 
controlled political and economic engagements. In the pursuit of Australian interests, 
he sought equity rather than hegemony. 
 
The development of a strong relationship between Australia and the United States 
caused tension within the Labor government and in particular between Evatt and 
Prime Minister Curtin. Personally, Evatt preferred to negotiate with representatives of 
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Great Britain as he considered them more sympathetic to the Australian cause.208 
Whereas Britain and Australia shared a long colonial history, the Australian 
relationship with the United States was a relatively new creation.209 This emphasized 
the anxieties caused by American-Japanese aggression in the Pacific, leading Evatt to 
be wary of over-reliance on the far away power.210 Particularly in the period of the 
war before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Evatt questioned the commitment of 
the United States to the protection of Pacific security and stability.211 As the growing 
global superpower, an unchecked United States posed a threat to Australian strategic 
and national interests.212 Yet despite Evatt’s personal objections to reliance on the 
United States, Prime Minister Curtin had outlined the development of that 
relationship as a central part of the Australian foreign policy agenda in his 1941 
address.213 At his direction, Evatt therefore conceded to the necessity of developing a 
strong Australian-American relationship in the hope of engendering support and a 
relationship of good will.214 
 
Evatt’s diplomacy in the early years of his term as Minister for External Affairs 
centered on the development of this relationship through diplomatic correspondence 
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and public appeals in Washington. Adopting the language that the United States 
public was so familiar with, Evatt strongly urged them to consider Australia a critical 
ally in the war effort.215 U.S war rhetoric mirrored the general focus on moral and 
political polarization of other Allied great states.216 These states espoused a human 
rights rhetoric that drew on the language of democracy and promised to curb of the 
political oppression that had ravaged Europe. 217  This focus on the political 
dimensions of the war foreshadowed the tensions between civil and political and 
socio-economic rights that characterized the early years of the United Nations. 218 
 
 In a broadcast in New York in 1942, Evatt encouraged listeners to consider Australia 
as an ally in the fight for freedom: ‘America and Australia are countries of freedom. 
We are fighting for freedom for the whole world. We are also fighting for freedom for 
ourselves.’219 Evatt reiterated this alignment in a statement in Sydney, 23 July 1945, 
considering the losses experienced by both nations: ‘…our hearts were saddened by 
the tragic deaths of two great wartime leaders- Franklin Roosevelt and John Curtin. 
The lives of both men were shortened by the untiring devotion with which they fought 
for fundamental human freedom and against the twin evils of Fascism and military 
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aggression.’220 The adoption of U.S war rhetoric allowed Evatt to promote strong 
relations and affinity between the two nations. His tour was marked by an exceptional 
number of public speeches and broadcasts, appealing to the public to consider 
Australia as a critical ally in the war.221 The U.S rhetoric of democracy and universal 
freedom provided a framework that allowed Evatt to encourage support for Australia 
as America’s ally in the universal fight against political oppression.222 
 
However, Evatt’s wartime rhetoric went beyond the encouragement of American-
Australian sympathies and the politicization of the language of human rights.223 
Shaped by his Labor ideology, Evatt considered economic instability to be a critical 
determinant of war and peace. 224  In a speech given in New York, 1943, Evatt sought 
to encourage the consideration of an economic peace and an international 
employment agreement.225 Evatt’s social policy saw unemployment as a critical factor 
in creating the social instability that facilitated the Fascist rise and the outbreak of 
war.226 As such, Evatt sought to extend the Australian economic policies of full 
employment to a world level.227 Evatt stated, ‘No world or regional system of 
security…can be permanent unless it has an adequate basis in economic justice…If 
freedom from want means anything it means decent standards of living for all people 
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and the end of any possibility of unfair exploitation of weak peoples by those who are 
stronger and economically more fully developed.’228  
 
Evatt recognized that economic isolationism was incompatible with a post-war system 
that sought to preserve peace, and thus sought to promote a global awareness of the 
need for international economic policies. He wrote, ‘Consequently Australia, the 
Argentine, and other great exporting countries, including Great Britain herself, are 
very conscious that the inability of countries to buy one’s own products has sharp and 
immediate repercussions on one’s own economic and the economy of the rest of the 
world.’229  In seeking to achieve this, Evatt promoted strong regionalism, trusteeship 
and international economic policies to ensure full employment.230 Evatt envisaged 
also the reconstruction of the International Labour Organisation and a recommitment 
to the pursuit of social justice and employment.231 
 
Full Employment and Social Justice at the United Nations 
Despite the difficulties of securing a policy of full employment on a domestic level, 
Evatt as the head of the Australian delegation saw more success on an international 
level. At the San Francisco talks regarding the fledgling United Nations organisation, 
Evatt strongly defended the Economic and Social Council and was a crucial actor in 
ensuring its power and centrality.232 Whilst the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement did offer 
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some proposals for international economic and social cooperation, they were, in 
Evatt’s opinion, severely inadequate.233 The original organisation envisaged by the 
Big Three saw the Security Council as the central organ and the General Assembly 
and Economic and Social Council as subsidiary bodies. 234  As worldwide 
unemployment had been a critical war catalyst in Evatt’s view, the lack of a central 
and well articulated international economic policy for the post-war years was a gross 
mis-sight.235 The Australian delegation submitted an amendment to the Dumbarton 
Oaks draft that demanded that members of the United Nations pledge themselves to 
the defense and advancement of ‘labour standards, economic advancement, social 
security and employment for all who seek it.’236  
 
The rights of individuals to employment opportunities was a central element of 
Evatt’s post-war activism, which he communicated to the Allies in the language of 
peace and security that was at the core of their evolving human rights policy.237 Evatt 
recognized that the Great Depression had been a fundamental factor in shaping the 
climate within which fascism and communism had sprung.  He considered this to be 
clear evidence towards the need to develop strong economic and social systems of 
justice.238  In an article published in the Annals of the Academy of Political and Social 
Science in 1946, Evatt wrote: ‘The great threat to human freedom which we have 
been combating for five years arose out of and was made possible by an environment 
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dominated by unemployment and lacking freedom from want.’239 In light of this, 
Evatt campaigned at San Francisco to strengthen the powers of the Economic and 
Social Council and to specify the principles of international economic and social 
cooperation.240 This was largely fulfilled when the Economic and Social Council was 
made a principal organ and its powers and jurisdiction were vastly widened. 241 In 
Evatt’s post-war work Task of Nations, he detailed the development of the post-war 
institution and the changes to the international system. In this, he considered the 
significance of economic instability to security: 
Economic disturbances often lie at the bottom of…political tensions, 
internally and in international relations. Trade disputes, economic 
expansionism, and denial of access to raw materials on equitable terms can 
lead to political action and retaliation and even to war. As Mr. Charles Malik 
of Lebanon said in his Presidential statement to the Economic and Social 
Council in July 1948, the work of the Security Council will decrease 
proportionally to the success of the Economic and Social Council in 
promoting solutions to economic and social problems.242 
 
Evatt’s petitioning to develop the Economic and Social Council sought not just to 
expand its powers but also to specifically include an agenda that pursued full 
employment. Evatt also petitioned to see full employment included in the Charter of 
the United Nations.243 The inclusion of a full employment clause in the declared 
objectives of the Economic and Social Council was the fruit of Evatt’s labour, and the 
direct product of a Labor influenced human rights ideology.244  
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Whilst the expansion of the Economic and Social Council was to be of great benefit to 
the post-war human rights regime, Evatt sought the creation of an international forum 
not for human rights, but for Australian interests. Similarly to his position on the 
General Assembly, Evatt sought to curb Great Power influence at the United Nations 
so that the post-war system would offer smaller or middle states, like Australia, the 
opportunity to participate more actively. As Australia was denied entry to the Security 
Council, the most effective means of elevating its influence in the post-war institution 
was to elevate the subsidiary organs within which the Australian delegates could 
exercise influence. Speaking of the preservation of social justice in the world, Evatt 
expressed the necessity of economic internationalism to domestic stability. 
It is a challenge to the sense of justice and service of all men, and our common 
humanity bids us lend a hand. Assistance to these countries is worthwhile even 
on selfish grounds. Their development helps everyone. An increased standard 
of living in one country means greater purchasing power for imports and 
thereby affords a bigger market for other countries. At the same time a new 
source of materials and goods is opened up, and the world as a whole benefits 
as well as the country concerned.245  
 
Evatt’s pursuit of social justice at San Francisco and in the Economic and Social 
Council was therefore defined by his attempts to further Australian prospects and 
influence in the post-war institution by stabilizing international security, extending the 
influence of Australian policies and strengthening the ‘global forum’ organs of the 
United Nations. 
  
Evatt’s promotion of social justice was largely bound together with his approach to 
the Trusteeship Council. Evatt sought to promote a system of international democracy 
in order to curb Great State hegemony and encourage the development of small and 
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middle states. 246He sought to achieve this through the trusteeship system of the 
United Nations, giving larger states the responsibility to encourage the development 
of smaller post-colonial states. It is in this regard that the benefit of this system to the 
Australian agenda is clear. Whilst Evatt had taken a clear interest in the international 
economic policies of the United Nations, (recognizing that regardless of the 
limitations of the ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy, the war in Europe would inevitably 
impact Australia’s postwar situation) his overwhelming focus was on the Pacific 
region.247 Even in the early years of the war, Evatt noted the importance of the role 
that the surrounding territories would play in post-war security.248 He was quoted in 
1943 stating: ‘It is obvious that there will have to be zones of security in areas like 
South-east Asia and the South and South-west Pacific. Of crucial importance to 
Australia’s own security will be such islands as Timor, New Guinea, the Solomons, 
the New Hebrides, Fiji, and New Caledonia.’249  
 
Evatt was also preoccupied with Australia’s security in the Pacific and asserted the 
fact that poor economic conditions in the Pacific would threaten Australia. 250 This 
was expressed in his engagements with the Australian trustee territories and in the 
Australian-New Zealand Pact. In applying this international economic policy, 
Australia under the Australian New Zealand Agreement sought to encourage stable 
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economic policies in the Pacific nations that surrounded them.251 In an address from 
Wellington in 1944, Evatt stated: ‘Australia and New Zealand are planning their 
policies to prevent aggression anywhere in the world and also to create conditions of 
welfare and economic justice.’252 Article 31 of the Agreement outlined that the two 
governments would establish the South Seas Regional Commission to ‘secure a 
common policy on social, economic and political development directed towards the 
advancement and the well-being of the native peoples…’ 253  This Commission 
recommended that natives participate in administration and self-government, material 
development, the co-ordination of health and education, maintenance, labour and 
social services, economic, social, medical and anthropological research collaboration, 
and the publishing of periodicals to review standards and conditions of living, work, 
education, health and welfare.254  
 
The United Nations’ trusteeship system therefore became the vehicle through which 
the Australian security position was consolidated in the Pacific. 255  Under the 
Trusteeship Council, Australia was afforded the responsibility for the democratic, 
economic and social development of Papua and New Guinea.256 The Australian 
trusteeship of Papua and New Guinea mitigated the prospect of the territory 
developing into a security threat in the same way as Indonesia. 257The Indonesian 
revolutions had challenged the colonial system and threatened Australian security in 
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the Pacific. 258Whilst Australia had emerged as a security power in the region, the 
prospect of trusteeship offered Australia with the opportunity to minimse the risk of 
recurring instability. 259 Evatt therefore proposed an approach to Papua and New 
Guinea that fostered strong economic and social policies, similar to those imposed in 
Australia and proposed to the United Nations.260 He stated, ‘These peoples cannot be 
excluded from the system of economic collaboration which the United Nations have 
envisaged.’261  
 
Evatt’s pursuit of socio-economic stability in the Pacific exhibited the paternalistic 
tone of his racial ideology.262 As staunch defendant of the White Australia Policy, 
Evatt subscribed to the quasi-colonial ideology of Australian racial and immigration 
policies during the 1940’s. How this ideology shaped his approach to trusteeship and 
social justice and will be considered in the following chapter. In the context of 
security however, Evatt demonstrably used the Australian influence over Papua and 
New Guinea to extend Australian influence, alleviate the risk of instability and protect 
Australian peace in the Pacific. Thus whilst the trusteeship system professed the 
pursuit of self-determination and universal human rights, it realistically offered 
Australia the opportunity to mold its surrounding territories into a complimentary 
political and socio-economic system favourable to Australian interests. 
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Conclusions: 
A core element of Herbert Evatt’s wartime and post-war agenda was the pursuit of 
social justice through international economic and trade policies, internationalism and 
full employment.263 A critical examination of these policies challenges the traditional 
view that Evatt subscribed to a cosmopolitan human rights vision by suggesting that 
social justice offered him the means of extending Australia’s post-war influence. 
Throughout the 1940’s, social justice became a vehicle used by Herbert Evatt to 
achieve an Australian national agenda. Seeking to extend Australia’s influence 
internationally, Evatt sought to promote the full employment policies that had been 
adopted domestically.264 The Labor government had been pursuing a policy of full 
employment throughout the wartime years and Evatt’s extensive experience in trade 
union and industrial disputes instilled a deep conviction in the need for full 
employment.265 The use of these policies particularly in regards to the Economic and 
Social Council reveals Evatt’s attempts to extend Australian influence over policy in 
the international system.  
 
Additionally, Evatt’s promotion of Australian interests through a social justice 
scheme was expressed in the changing Australian-American diplomatic relationship. 
The United States emerged from the war a political and economic superpower that 
rejected the Australian precedent of preferential economic policies. 266 Recognising 
the likelihood of the United States dominating the post-war system, Evatt sought to 
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foster a strong diplomatic relationship.267 Prime Minister Curtin considered this to be 
a central part of Australia’s war aims.268 Evatt spent the following years in close 
negotiations with Washington, securing Australian interests and petitioning the public 
to consider Australia a close ally. Evatt’s adoption of the Rooseveltian language of 
‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ demonstrates this affinity. 269  Despite fostering this 
relationship, Evatt strongly asserted the need to establish an international economic 
system of democracy and equity. His proposals to expand the powers of the Economic 
and Social Council sought to mitigate U.S dominance and elevate the opportunities 
offered to smaller and middle states. 
 
Whilst Evatt’s vision was primarily achieved through the Economic and Social 
Council, the Trusteeship Council and the post-war trusteeship system also became a 
crucial vehicle through which Australian dominance was expressed. As Evatt 
considered economic instability and unemployment to be a central factor in the 
outbreak of war, he held strongly to the conviction that Australia had a vested interest 
in the policies of its surrounding territories. 270  Particularly in regards to the trusted 
territories of Papua and New Guinea, Evatt sought to ensure that employment and 
social stability allayed the threat of Pacific instability.271 The imposition of Australian 
policies in this territory likewise extended Australian influence and fostered the 
creation of Australia as a leading power in the Pacific.  
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Therefore, the central mandate of Evatt’s social justice agenda was not the pursuit of 
universal human rights but of national interest. By promoting Australian influences 
internationally through the Economic and Social Council and the trusteeship system, 
Evatt established Australia as a central player in the creation of international 
economic policies.272 Furthermore, the mitigation of Great Power hegemony by 
limiting the powers of the Security Council and buttressing the Economic and Social 
Council promoted an equitable international democracy within which Australia could 
develop into a leading Pacific, and international power. In this way, Evatt utilized the 
human rights agenda in order to further Australian interests in the Pacific region, and 
in the world forum, by extending the reach of its policies and seeking the stabilization 
of security worldwide. 
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Chapter Three: Evatt and the White Australia Policy 
 
One of the central debates over the post-war human rights order was the place of 
domestic jurisdiction and national sovereignty.273 The post-war human rights regime 
professed a universalism that threatened the sovereignty of the nation-state and the 
possibility of an isolationist state.274 As states increasingly subscribed to this vision, 
the tension between national and supranational obligations became clear.275 Domestic 
policies were brought before the international community and scrutinized in an 
unprecedented way and proposals for international courts and tribunals unsettled 
those conservative statesmen who considered the sanctity of their national sovereignty 
paramount.276 The tensions of this context manifested nowhere more clearly than in 
the widely debated issues of immigration and domestic racial policies. Whilst much 
study has been devoted to the disjunction between Jan Smuts’ international human 
rights vision and domestic policy, the Australian comparison has been left relatively 
untouched.277 In the person of Evatt, this disjunction is vividly clear and has profound 
implications for the interpretation of his human rights agenda.  
 
A close examination of the relationship between Evatt’s domestic and international 
policies reveals the unrelenting influence of his national agenda. At the San 
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Francisco Conference and in his position on South Africa’s apartheid regime and on 
the Ad-Hoc Committee regarding Palestine, Evatt’s concern in protecting Australia’s 
domestic White Australia Policy undermined his professed human rights vision. At 
San Francisco, Evatt sought to buttress the sovereignty of the nation-state by 
protecting domestic jurisdiction in the wording of the Charter.278 Furthermore, the 
paternalistic ideology of Australia’s domestic policy influenced Evatt’s approach to 
the trusteeship system and his negotiations regarding the path towards self-
determination for post-colonial states. In each of these situations, Evatt sought to 
extend the reach of Australian racial paternalism reach beyond Australian borders.279 
Evatt subscribed to the view that self-determination would be a slow process through 
which welfarist states such as Australia provided or imposed systems of government 
and policies upon fledgling democracies entrusted to them by the Trusteeship 
Council.280  
 
His concern for domestic affairs was clearly expressed in his responses to a number of 
precedent forming United Nations decisions, as he sought to affirm the sovereignty of 
the nation-state.281 Under Evatt’s instruction, Australia repeatedly supported South 
Africa’s claim to the General Assembly that its domestic apartheid regime was 
untouchable by the international community.282 Finally on the Ad Hoc Committee 
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into Palestine, Evatt ensured that Australia abstained from voting so that his concerns 
over a precedent of intervention could be appeased. In each of these cases, Australia’s 
national concerns informed Evatt’s agenda. Evatt sought to establish a precedent 
wherein national sovereignty was inviolable to the international community. In this 
regard, Evatt revealed his identity as a devout advocate of the Australian national 
agenda, seeking to establish an international system that would enhance Australia’s 
post-war situation. The defense of Australia’s domestic racial policy therefore 
undermined any of his attempts to support a post-war human rights regime. 
 
National Sovereignty and International Obligation 
Historians across the field have recognized the fact that the Great Powers were 
reluctant to place human rights at the center of their post-war planning. 283  The 
central reason for this unwillingness was the threat that a supranational authority 
would pose to their domestic agendas.284 Subscription to a higher authority brought 
with it international scrutiny, international demands and a set of standardised, codified 
rights and obligations.285 However, the manifestation of the tension between national 
sovereignty and international obligation for states such as Australia has been a lesser 
consideration for historians. Whilst states such as Great Britain held a vested interest 
in the protection of national sovereignty for the preservation of imperial power, small 
and middle states stood to gain from an international system in which the power of the 
great states was diluted.286 Particularly as many of the post-colonial states desired 
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international scrutiny of the imperial powers, the approach of small and middle states 
to national sovereignty is of interest.  
 
As the representative of small states, Australia seemingly supported an international 
system of transparency.287 Evatt championed the challenge to Big Power centralism at 
San Francisco and sought to ensure that the organisation be defined by transparent 
and free discussion.288 His petitioning to expand the systemic and discursive powers 
and responsibilities of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council 
exemplify this. Evatt’s support for transparency however, did not extend to the realm 
of national sovereignty. Evatt’s support for a seemingly supra-national institution was 
vastly overwhelmed by his protection of national sovereignty at the United Nations.289  
At the San Francisco Conference, Evatt reiterated how sovereignty and statehood 
were crucial to his vision of the post-war order. ‘Every country represented in this 
conference has…its own vital spheres of domestic policy in which it cannot, without 
forfeiting its very existence as a state, permit external intervention.’290This defense of 
domestic jurisdiction and the White Australia Policy was the product of his immediate 
situation within the discourses of race, immigration and empire in the 1940’s. 
 
                                                
287 Devereux, Australia and the Birth of the International Bill of Human Rights, p. 
187. 
288 Evatt, The United Nations, p.19. 
289 Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel, p.48. 
290 Herbert Evatt, ‘Amendment by the Australian Delegation to Proposed Paragraph 8 
of Charter II (Principles)’, 14 June 1945, quoted in Lauren, The Evolution of 
International Human Rights, p. 188. 
 65 
Race, immigration and empire 
Changing discourses of race, immigration and empire informed conceptions of the 
White Australia Policy in the 1940’s.291 As anticolonialism spurred movements away 
from the traditional racial paradigm of the imperial states and the assumptions at the 
core of their racial ideology, supporters of the White Australia Policy were forced to 
reconstitute their defense.292 In particular, the evolution of the Australian racial 
ideology from the ‘natural’ British imperial ideology to the socio-economic 
Australian White Australia Policy was a crucial factor in the light of Japan’s growing 
Pacific presence and social anxieties regarding the ‘Yellow Peril’. 293   It is therefore 
important to consider how Australia’s colonial heritage shaped its immigration and 
racial policy in the early twentieth century, and how these discourses transformed in a 
transitional world order. The importance of this context was furthered by Evatt’s 
personal academic fascination with the evolution of empire and the Commonwealth, 
as his ideology was largely shaped by this study and by the contemporary pressures of 
wartime society.  His academic works reveal a deep fascination with Australia’s place 
in this transition, and a concern for international ideational trends. 294 
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There were three main pressures influencing the White Australia Policy in the early 
twentieth century. First, the ideational heritage of Australia as a Dominion state; 
second, the security concerns of the Yellow Peril; and third, the economic anxieties 
over the increasing migrant population of Australia. Each of these factors contributed 
to the debate over the White Australia Policy in the 1940’s, and to Evatt’s support for 
it.  
 
When considering the racial ideology of Australia at the time of its federation in 1901, 
comparisons have often been made to Nazi Germany and the ‘herrenvolk 
democracies’.295 I would argue however, that in light of the nuances of the Australian 
racial ideology and the contextual pressures of the early twentieth century, perhaps a 
more apt comparison would be to that of apartheid South Africa.296 The European 
discourse on race was largely biological or ‘natural’. These racial theories considered 
racial superiority to be an inherent reality, leading to the terminology of the 
‘herrenvolk’, or master race. 297  The racial ideology of South Africa, however, 
exhibited the influence of its Dominion status.298 The apartheid regime coalesced the 
imprint of traditional imperial racial assumptions with the socio-economic and 
political demands of the mid-twentieth century Dominion state. 299  This unique 
framework shaped the exclusive immigration policies adopted by many Dominion 
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states.300 It is in this regard that the White Australia Policy is more suited to 
comparison to South Africa than to the European empires.  
 
Australia and South Africa were awarded Dominion status in 1907 and 1910 
respectively, and exhibited racial ideologies that were influenced by European 
‘natural’ discourses of race. The British influence over the Australian political system 
and its liberal democratic political ideology embedded the assumption that economic, 
social and security policies demanded racial homogeneity.301 However, the Dominion 
racial ideology diverged from that of the European imperial states due to the unique 
demands of the middle state.302 The transformation of the imperial power system in 
the early twentieth century was crucial in developing the foreign policy of states such 
as Australia.303 Mazower considers this to be one of ‘imperial internationalism’, as 
imperialism evolved in a changing modern era.304 This evolution placed Australia in 
the unique position of being a Dominion state while the world shifted from an 
imperial to post-colonial framework. 305  Imperial heritage must therefore be 
considered as a significant factor in state formation and the formation of the 
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Dominion ideology, yet the independent nature of these immigration policies must be 
noted.306  
 
Considered as ‘between a colony and a state’, the granting of self-governing 
Dominion status to these select majority Anglo-Saxon, white states distanced them 
from the British Home Office and offered an unprecedented degree of autonomy. 307  
When viewed in light of Evatt’s post-war small state strategy, one can consider this 
development as a crucial step towards establishing Australia as a leader of small, 
post-colonial states, forging a path towards true international democracy. Yet rather 
than removing these states from the British racial policy that had so defined its 
imperial agenda, the granting of Dominion status furthered this racial framework.308 
Dominion status was extended only to states whose racial policies were congruous 
with the broader British racial ideology. 309  In a world that considered racial 
homogeneity to be a prerequisite to security and stability, self-governing Dominion 
status was only extended to states that could be trusted with the responsibilities of 
government.310  
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‘Dominion capitalism’ was therefore predicated upon racial homogeneity and fortified 
traditional connections to Britain. 311 In the face of the threat of the ‘Yellow Peril’ and 
Asian immigration, the Dominion states therefore banded together on the common 
basis of their white Anglo-Saxon heritage and commonality. 312 This was particularly 
experienced in the Pacific, with the strengthening of relations between Australia and 
New Zealand and the creation of a Dominion regional defense system. 313  An 
international movement towards Dominion internationalism was thus occurring in 
reaction to the destabilization and refugee crisis incurred by the war.314 
 
Australia’s Dominion status was also a crucial source of support in the face of the 
growing threat of Japan.315 The appeal of Dominion status lay in the balancing of 
political independence and imperial protection.316 The growth of the Japanese military 
threat and the withdrawal of Britain from the Pacific in the early twentieth century 
unsettled the Australian leadership, revealing the changing world system in which 
imperial Britain would be too far away to provide assistance should Australia be 
threatened in the Pacific.317 Despite many scholars attributing the origins of the White 
Australia Policy to the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, the victory of Japan in the 
1905 Russo-Japanese War marked the true origins of a truly independent Australian 
                                                
311 Ehrensaft, ‘Dominion Capitalism: A First Statement’, p.352. See also: John Lack, 
Bold Experiment: a documentary history of Australian immigration since 1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. xi. 
312 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p.35. See also: Lack, Bold Experiment, p. xi. 
313 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p.35. 
314 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 191. 
315 Jayasuriya, The Australian-Asian Connection, p. 7. 
316 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 35. See also: Ward, Australia and the British 
Embrace, p. 16. 
317 Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p.271. See also: Erez Manela, The 
Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 182. 
 70 
notion of the ‘Yellow Peril’.318 This threat increased following the First World War 
and highlighted the unique dangers facing the Australian state.319 Evatt himself noted 
this, in the introduction to Gilmore’s foreign policy work, Near North. He wrote; 
‘…Great Britain began after the first world war to withdraw her direct political 
interests from the Far East and India, and her political power in those regions became 
increasingly dependent on or converted to commercial power. The second world war 
accelerated this movement.’320  
 
These origins brought Australia’s vulnerability against Japanese expansion into stark 
relief.321 Despite being delayed by the First World War, the development of an 
independent Australian security policy became a critical concern in the 1940’s. The 
way in which Evatt fostered regional security can therefore be seen in this context of 
racial anxiety as the expression of Australia’s paternalistic racial ideology. Indeed 
Evatt himself noted this, writing, ‘The struggle against the Fascist dictators, 
culminating in the war against Japan and a grave threat to Australia’s own territories, 
all helped to awaken intense interest in Australia’s proper role in international 
affairs.’322 The White Australia Policy in the 1940’s therefore became increasingly 
security oriented, seeking to protect Australia from the ‘Yellow Peril’ and from the 
Japanese threat.  
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The ‘Yellow Peril’ was also perceived as a significant threat to Australia’s economic 
stability and to white Australian jobs.323 For Evatt, this was a central factor. 324 The 
Second World War incited a mass immigration and refugee movement that placed 
significant pressure on Australia to soften its immigration policies. The growing 
Japanese threat in the Pacific led to thousands fleeing south and seeking refuge, and 
work, in Australia. Fearful of the impact that mass Asian immigration would have 
upon Australian labour and workers, Evatt opposed absolute freedom of migration.325 
Writing of the White Australia Policy, Evatt argued that ‘…we must maintain it. It is 
not an aggressive but a defensive policy, not political but economic in character and 
substance. Had Japanese migration been permitted to New Guinea or Australia, 
economic standards would have deteriorated and our territories would have been first 
infiltrated and then overthrown by the aggressor.’326  
 
Thus despite his emphasis on fostering a strong diplomatic relationship with South 
East Asian Nations, Evatt considered the White Australia Policy to be ‘absolutely 
basic to the economy and politics of the country.’327 The deviations from the 
conservative immigration policy that were demanded during the wartime years were 
considered by Evatt to be necessary, but temporary, wartime alterations.328 The 
London Times quoted Evatt as expressing his view explicitly; ‘Australia could and 
should be developed as a white man’s country. That policy was based largely on the 
economic fact that the introduction of coloured labour would lower and ultimately 
destroy the standard of living which had been built up in that country. There was also 
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the practical impossibility of assimilating Asiatic races without the deterioration of 
the races concerned.’329 By the 1940’s, Evatt’s position on the White Australia Policy 
had not shifted. 
 
Whilst the government responded to the pressures of the Second World War by 
strengthening the White Australia Policy, it public popularity was undermined by 
social shifts.330 Particularly in the post-war years, the government faced pressure to 
liberalise its stringent immigration policy as the population increasingly claimed that 
the White Australia Policy was incompatible with contemporary Australia.331 In July 
1945 Labor immigration Minister Arthur Calwell called for increased immigration to 
repopulate Australia’s vulnerable areas. 332  Whilst he primarily sought British 
migration, he recognized that Asian immigration was a necessary and unavoidable 
occurrence.333 The assumptions that formed the foundation of the imperial racial 
ideology were challenged by returning soldiers who had worked in the South Pacific 
and Asia and by social groups rejecting the premise of racial paternalism.334 Plans 
such as the Colombo Plan contributed to this growing pressure.335 Furthermore, with 
the articulation of rights and in particular the prohibition of racial discrimination in 
the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration, the Australian immigration policy was 
brought into scrutiny. Individuals denied entry increasingly brought their concerns 
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through the media and through petitioning to the international community, claiming 
that Australia’s policy violated these clauses.336  
 
These pressures formed part of the growing voice within Australian society to 
liberalize, but not remove, the White Australia Policy, weakening the strictures 
limiting acceptance into Australian society.337 This domestic pressure augmented the 
anxiety of the government regarding the changing global system.338 Yet it was not 
until the post-war years when soldiers returned and society began to stabilize that 
these demands were voiced. A tightening of racial and immigration policy, enhanced 
by racially divisive war propaganda, defined the wartime years.339 
 
These disputes over race and immigration formed the platform for one of the crucial 
human rights debates of the wartime years- the place of the nation-state and national 
sovereignty. 340  Whilst espousing human rights rhetoric, the major hesitation of 
statesmen and women to a fully realized human rights regime was the threat it posed 
to national sovereignty. States were unwilling to subject themselves to a supra-
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national authority, and this unwillingness saw the United Nations formed as a non-
binding institution.341  
 
Evatt at San Francisco: the protection of national sovereignty at the 
United Nations 
In his contributions to post-war reconstruction Evatt was directed by his domestic 
agenda in protecting Australia’s national sovereignty and ability to continue 
implementing the White Australia Policy.342 The impact of Australia’s domestic 
concerns upon Evatt’s international activism can be clearly seen in his proposals for 
the United Nations organisation at the San Francisco Conference, and in his concerns 
over the precedent set by debate over South Africa and the Ad Hoc Committee 
regarding Palestine.  
 
Evatt’s agenda at San Francisco was shaped by his national agenda, seeking to 
construct a post-war international system in such a way as to extend Australian 
interests. In the foreword to Robert Gilmore’s work, Near North, Evatt wrote: ‘While 
Australia is anxious to help her neighbours in their progress towards self-government 
and democracy and economic security, she must reserve the right and perform the 
duty of safeguarding within Australia those standards which her own people have 
won only after a century and a half of hard pioneering and democratic practices.’343 
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Yet the pursuit of Australian interests often caused Evatt’s policy to become 
inconsistent, particularly in his position on domestic sovereignty.344  
 
Originally, Evatt had been an active supporter of minimizing domestic jurisdiction.345 
Recognising that the mitigation of domestic sovereignty would allow Australia a level 
of influence in other countries national affairs, Evatt pursued the vision of an 
international democratic community where domestic concerns could be brought to the 
international forum.346 However, this policy was quickly abandoned when it was 
highlighted that it would undermine Australia’s domestic independence.347 As such, 
Evatt’s agenda at San Francisco radically shifted to consolidate the impenetrability of 
the nation-state through domestic jurisdiction allowances that excluded national 
immigration policies from the jurisdiction of the United Nations.348 The original 
Dumbarton Oaks drafts discussed only briefly the extent of domestic sovereignty and 
jurisdiction. 349  Following Evatt’s recognition that an international system that 
weakened national sovereignty would threaten the continuation of the White Australia 
Policy, the strengthening of the domestic jurisdiction principle became a central part 
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of his agenda at San Francisco.350 This pursuit manifested in the wording of Article 2 
(7) of the Charter, protecting the domestic jurisdiction of any state.351   
 
The influence of the Australian national agenda on Evatt’s agenda at San Francisco is 
clearly seen in his promotion of the Trusteeship Council. 352Superficially, Evatt’s 
support for national self-determination and the interests of native inhabitants of non-
self-governing territories seems to contradict the racial ideology of the White 
Australia Policy. However Evatt’s support can be seen as an attempt to further 
Australia’s standing in the international community by allowing it influence over 
smaller nations, and the manifestation of racial paternalism.353 In the context of 
Evatt’s overwhelming national agenda at San Francisco, his advocacy of a trusteeship 
system reveals his attempts to extend the reach of Australian influence in the 
Pacific.354  
 
Evatt and the Australian delegation strongly contributed to the drafting of Chapters 
XI-XII of the Charter, articulating the post-war ‘trusteeship’ system. 355  The 
Trusteeship system offered Evatt the opportunity to establish Australia the leading 
power in the Pacific.356 This had been Evatt’s intention throughout the war, as he 
noted Australia and New Zealand’s unique Dominion status in the Pacific and 
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considered this as necessitating their leadership.357 In an address delivered in 1943, 
Evatt stated; ‘The two British democracies in the Pacific- Australia and New Zealand- 
are the trustees of democratic civilization in the South Pacific…the war [has forced] 
upon the Australian people the full consciousness of the fact that their responsibilities 
and their rights are primarily those of a key Pacific nation.’358 
 
This policy manifested in Australia’s administration of Papua and New Guinea.359 
Australia’s role as trustee gave the government the responsibility to develop the 
surrounding post-colonial nations towards social and political independence.360 For 
Evatt, this was an opportunity to minimize the risks of non-democratic and unfriendly 
Pacific nations threatening Australia and to extend the paternalistic racial ideology of 
the White Australia Policy to an international level. 361  Minister for External 
Territories E.J. Ward expressed how Australia sought to become a leader for the 
world in its approach to Trusteeship. ‘We hope to be able to set an example to the 
world of the conditions we establish there, and by the manner in which we develop 
the Territories. When the system of trusteeship begins to operate fully, Australia will 
have no need to be ashamed of what has been accomplished by a Labor Government 
in caring for its dependent Territories, and particularly for the needs of the 
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inhabitants.’362  
 
The paternalistic racial ideology that characterized the White Australia Policy 
informed the pseudo-colonial approach that Australia took to trusteeship.363 This 
ideology was expressed by the ambassador to the United States, Frederick Eggleston, 
who reiterated to Evatt their common view: ‘There is a rather naive idea in U.S.A. 
that all human groups are capable of self-government and are prevented 
from exercising these privileges by sinister influence… Experience has shown that 
these immature states are incapable of defending themselves in a jungle world 
and therefore their external policy is a matter very largely of chance…the primitive 
peoples will need a lot of political tutelage.’364 Evatt strongly supported the need to 
develop the state-structures of nations that were considered unable to achieve self-
determination alone. 365  This approach allowed Australia to encourage peaceful 
democracies in the Pacific and build a strong regional security bloc. 
 
The Precedent Set by South Africa and Palestine 
The influence of Australia’s domestic concerns on Evatt’s international activism 
extended to his engagements with other national disputes. First demonstrated in his 
rejection of proposals to bring the apartheid situation in South Africa to the General 
Committee and in his work on the Committee into Palestine, Evatt was preoccupied 
with the precedent that these decisions would set. Had the United Nations decided to 
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allow for international engagement in domestic concerns, the White Australia Policy 
(already becoming increasingly scrutinized by Evatt’s contemporaries) would have 
been threatened by international intervention. 366  As such, Evatt voted against 
international involvement in domestic concerns in an attempt to protect a precedent of 
national sovereignty.367 
 
One of the most controversial General Assembly discussions in the early years of the 
United Nations was that of South Africa and allegations of human rights violations. 
From the 1940’s onwards, the issue of South Africa and the apartheid regime was 
brought to the United Nations General Assembly.368 Concerns over the government’s 
alleged violation of human rights again raised the enduring question of the decade, the 
place of national sovereignty in a human rights regime.369 Members of the General 
Committee were called to vote on whether or not the allegations should be brought 
before the General Assembly, an action that had the potential to incite a Security 
Council resolution for intervention in some form.370 When Evatt came to the vote, he 
supported the South African defense of national sovereignty and rejected the motion 
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to bring the issue to the General Assembly.371 It is in this regard that his personal 
support for the White Australia Policy is of great importance. The South African 
apartheid regime was the first issue of the national governance of a ‘civilized’, 
Dominion state to be brought before the international community. The decision 
regarding it would therefore establish a precedent for a category of nation within 
which Australia would fall. Were the international community to decide that it 
possessed the requisite authority to intervene in issues of domestic policy, the White 
Australia Policy would be under threat.  
 
Evatt adopted a sympathetic approach to questions over South Africa’s policies 
regarding South-West Africa in the Fourth Committee session.372 In these discussions, 
Evatt stated, ‘I pay tribute to Mr Lawrence and General Smuts for the magnificent 
war job of the Union of South Africa. I do not like their being pilloried here. Nor do I 
like to enter upon a comparison of the conditions in South Africa as far as freedom 
and practice of democracy.’373The parallels between the Australian and South African 
situation at this time are vivid.374 Historians have widely considered the disjunction 
between Jan Smuts’ professed human rights vision and the realities of his domestic 
policy.375 His intentions in drafting human rights into the preamble of the Charter 
have been considered as an attempt to continue the imperialism that furthered South 
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African prospects internationally, rather than an endorsement of a human rights 
regime for the world. Evatt’s actions can be considered in a similar light.376  
 
The second precedent-making moment in which Evatt demonstrated his concern for 
national sovereignty was on the Ad-Hoc Committee into Palestine in 1948.377 The 
United Nations’ debate over Palestine became one of the most political and 
controversial decisions of its early years. Evatt’s agenda in this context was clearly 
shaped by domestic concerns, and anxieties over the creation of a precedent of 
international intervention in domestic affairs. Evatt’s agenda in protecting the White 
Australia Policy invariably defined his position on Palestine and the role of the 
international community. Early on in negotiations, a number of Australian delegates 
proposed that Australia support partition.378 At the time of the vote, it was only due to 
Evatt’s insistence that Australia abstained from the vote.379  
 
It is in this regard that Evatt’s personal domestic agenda is revealed. Whilst Evatt did 
not openly support or reject partition, his direction of Australia’s absenting vote was 
lead by his recognition that a precedent of domestic jurisdiction and international 
intervention would be set by this ruling. Due to the controversial nature of the 
situation and the division of the Australian delegation on the matter, Evatt directed 
Australia to absent, not oppose the partition ruling. This decision protected Australia 
from inciting animosity from either party, and the nations supporting them, whilst 
protecting the precedent of national sovereignty and domestic impenetrability. 380 This 
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direction thus preserved the continuation of Australia’s exclusive immigration 
policies. 381 This argument is supported by a report made by Hood into Evatt’s 
drafting of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. This report argued:  
…from Australia’s point of view there would be a narrow line between the 
United Nations attempting to impose upon the Palestinian Arabs an obligation 
to admit further Jewish immigrants ad the United Nations attempting to open 
the doors of Australia to Asiatic immigration on the pretext that the Australian 
immigration policy was contrary to the principle of the Charter in so car as it 
involved racial discrimination.382  
 
The formative influence that Evatt’s personal subscription to the White Australia 
Policy had on his international agenda is thus evident in his responses to questions 
over the South African apartheid regime and West-African annexation, and the 
potential partition of Palestine. Evatt’s agenda at the United Nations was 
demonstrably directed by his desire to protect the nation-state against proposals to 
weaken national sovereignty. His personal commitment to a domestic agenda and 
vision of a post-war world that benefited Australian interests therefore undermined 
the realization of international human rights. 
 
Conclusions: 
The influence of the White Australia Policy on Herbert Evatt’s international activism 
reveals how the tensions between national sovereignty and international responsibility 
manifested in the Australian context of the 1940’s. This in turn has profound 
implications for the interpretation of Evatt’s human rights vision, suggesting that his 
universalism was undermined by a strong subscription to the Australian national 
agenda. The White Australia Policy in the 1940’s was strongly influenced by 
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circulating discourses of race and empire. 383  Stemming from the ideological 
foundations of the colonial state, the liberal democratic ideology of Australia as a 
Dominion state was predicated upon the assumption of racial homogeneity.384 This 
assumption was increasingly defended as the threats of the ‘Yellow Peril’, Asian 
migration and wartime pressures grew.385 Evatt’s support for restricted immigration 
was founded on economic and security concerns, rather than European biological 
racial discourses.386 Yet at its core, Evatt’s view was rooted in the British colonial 
assumptions of racial homogeneity.387  Evatt later expressed his belief that if non-
white immigration were to be allowed, immigrants would be required to assimilate to 
all aspects of Australian culture.388 
 
Closer examination of how Evatt engaged with his domestic and international 
obligations suggests that his national agenda undermined any form of universal 
human rights vision. Internationally Evatt professed support for the universal human 
rights vision of the United Nations, advertising a democratic small state strategy. 
However, his actions at the San Francisco Conference and his responses to a number 
of precedent-forming decisions vividly reveal how his agenda was shaped by the 
intent to protect Australia’s domestic sovereignty and ability to enact the White 
Australia Policy from international scrutiny. In debates over the South African 
apartheid regime, Evatt voted against allowing domestic concerns to be brought under 
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the jurisdiction of the international community in the United Nations.389 On the Ad-
Hoc Committee regarding Palestine, Evatt ensured that the Australian delegation 
abstained from voting, fearful of a precedent that would open the White Australia 
Policy up to international scrutiny.390  
 
Evatt’s defense of the White Australia Policy and attempts to protect Australia from 
international intervention draw his human rights vision into question. These actions 
also question his belief in the supra-national, suggesting instead that his actions were 
motivated by domestic concerns. Despite his proposals for a democratic small state 
strategy, Evatt’s racial ideology undermined the realization of his professed human 
rights vision. This suggests that rather than being motivated by a subscription to the 
cosmopolitan vision of the United Nations or to universalism, Evatt was motivated by 
a staunch conviction to Australian national projects and a desire to protect Australian 
domestic concerns. His involvement in the United Nations was defined by his 
domestic agenda rather than by a pursuit of human rights. Furthermore, Evatt’s 
actions can be considered to a great extent as an attempt to conceal Australia’s 
violations of the United Nations charter by strengthening the impenetrability of the 
nation-state.  
 
When interpreting Herbert Evatt’s contribution to the post-war human rights regime, 
his subscription to and defense of the White Australia Policy is therefore of 
unparalleled importance. The way in which this policy shaped his international 
actions demonstrates how he was motivated by a strong conviction to the Australian 
national agenda, rather than a utopian human rights vision. Evatt, like so many of his 
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contemporary statesmen, can therefore be seen as sacrificing the full realization of the 
1940’s human rights vision to the protection of the nation-state and domestic 
sovereignty. 
 86 
 Conclusion: 
 
Herbert Evatt’s career in international relations during the 1940’s has often been 
interpreted as the genuine pursuit of international human rights. 391  Evatt was 
extensively involved in Australian foreign affairs and the United Nations institution. 
His activism in promoting a post-war human rights regime has seen historians 
accredit him as a Labor party hero, internationalist and human rights activist.392 When 
contemplating Evatt’s deviations from the promotion of human rights, most notably 
his subscription to the White Australia policy and a colonial racial ideology, such 
histories consider these domestic commitments to be the unfortunate diversion of an 
otherwise indisputable human rights ideology. Biographies by Tennant, Dalziel and 
Hasluck in particular defend Evatt’s human rights vision.393 A previous thesis by 
Emma Ede likewise considers Evatt to be a genuine internationalist marred by 
domestic commitments that can be understood as an unavoidable imprint from his 
domestic context.394 
 
This thesis has contested this assumption. A critical examination of Evatt’s career and 
agenda throughout the 1940’s suggests that such domestic commitments directed, 
rather than diverted, his international agenda. Put simply, to Evatt international 
human rights became the vehicle through which Australian national goals could be 
achieved. Post-war reconstruction offered Evatt the opportunity to expand Australia’s 
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post-war influence and international standing. Considering the three central elements 
of his international agenda - the promotion of a small state strategy, social justice and 
the White Australia Policy - a closer examination of Evatt’s motivations for shaping 
the post-war international system reveals that his international activism was driven by 
the pursuit of national projects and an Australian national agenda.  
 
A central element of Evatt’s approach to international relations in the 1940s was the 
development of a small state strategy.395 Whilst many historians have considered this 
small state support to be the manifestation of Evatt’s universal human rights 
subscription, the inconsistencies of his policies reveal his pursuit of an Australian 
national agenda.396 Evatt’s diplomatic work in the 1940’s sought to establish Australia 
as a leader of the growing small state and anticolonial movement whilst fostering 
strong connections to Great Britain and the United States.397 The balancing of these 
commitments was central to Evatt’s development of an independent Australian 
foreign policy. This development has often been considered his greatest legacy. 398  
As Minister for External Affairs, Evatt distanced the Ministry of External Affairs 
from London by expanding its responsibilities, independent Australian diplomatic 
representation and challenging the ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy.399 Yet despite this, 
Evatt recongised the necessity of strong connections to the great states and thus 
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fostered British and U.S solidarity.400 This balancing of imperial and anticolonial 
commitments defined his international agenda in this period and explains his 
fluctuating policies. Evatt’s subscription to either movement was defined not by a 
universalist agenda, but by the opportunities offered to Australian post-war interests.  
 
Despite professing to be a representative of small states, Evatt attempted to secure an 
Australian position on the Security Council in talks at the San Francisco 
conference.401 When this was unsuccessful, his policy shifted towards an attempt to 
orchestrate an international democratic forum that would challenge the power of the 
Security Council.402 To Evatt, a system of international democracy presented an 
opportunity for Australia to improve its international influence.403 Mitigating Great 
State powers and enhancing the Australian influence over small states would achieve 
this. Evatt therefore sought to strengthen the General Assembly and expand its 
responsibilities, investing in the organs of the United Nations within which Australia 
could most effectively exercise influence.404  
 
When considering how Evatt’s commitments to the imperial and anticolonial 
movements were directed by his pursuit of Australian interests, it is vital to note that 
neither movement can be considered a genuine human rights movement.405 The 
imperial agenda in the 1940’s conflicted with the universalism desired by human 
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rights activists.406 The great states sought to construct the post-war system in such a 
way as to preserve their power dominance.407 The anticolonial agenda has often been 
considered a human rights movement, however it fundamentally entrenched the 
sovereignty of the nation-state and failed to promote supra-nationalism. 408 
Anticolonialism pursued statehood and self-determination in order to participate 
equitably in the post-war system.409 Such endeavours furthered the centrality of 
individual state sovereignty to the international system, rather than encouraging the 
weakening of rigid national boundaries.410 
 
 It is thus in light of Evatt’s arbitrary commitments to imperialism and 
anticolonialism, two post-war regimes that challenged the human rights movement 
and offered competing utopian visions, that his national agenda is clear. Evatt pursued 
the development of an independent Australian foreign policy founded on regionalism 
and the promotion of an international democracy within which Australian influences 
could be more effectively exercised. Evatt’s international activism often undermined 
the realization of universal human rights as he used the human rights movement in 
order to achieve national goals. 
 
The promotion of social justice became a central policy agenda within Evatt’s 
balancing of imperial and anticolonial commitments to construct an independent 
Australian small state strategy.411 His approach to the policies proposed at the United 
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Nations for the realization of social justice and economic rights demonstrates how his 
attempts to expand Australian influence in the post-war system extended beyond his 
political and diplomatic endeavours. International social justice policies offered to 
Evatt the opportunity to curb U.S hegemony, establish Australia as a policy-
influencing nation and afford influence over small states in the Pacific.412 Each of 
these acted to further the Australian post-war situation and enhance Australian 
interests. 
 
The post-war order was shaped largely by the emergence of the United States as a 
political and economic power holder.413 The United States sought to construct the 
post-war economic order against the preferential systems adopted by Britain and the 
Dominion states.414 Such changes would enhance its economic dominance.415 Evatt 
rejected this premise, recognizing that the U.S vision for the post-war economic order 
threatened Australian economic opportunities. 416  A post-war economic system 
dominated by an unchecked United States undermined the opportunities for small and 
middle states to develop their economic influence and benefit from the post-war 
reconstructive effort.417 Evatt therefore sought to challenge this vision by encouraging 
the expansion of the Economic and Social Council’s responsibilities and promoting 
social justice. 418  Yet this approach was balanced with the fostering of strong 
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connections to the United States, seeking (at Prime Minister Curtin’s instruction) to 
maintain the solidarity of the two states.419  
 
Despite his strong promotion of regionalism, Evatt recognized that war could not be 
confined to one part of the globe in an increasingly internationalized world.420 War in 
Europe would inevitably affect conditions in the Pacific, whether it manifested in 
military aggression, political instability or economic turmoil.421 Evatt considered the 
economic instability caused by unemployment in Europe to be a central element 
contributing to the outbreak of war.422 As such, he advocated a post-war system that 
would ensure security through full employment and social stability.423 His professed 
policies were based on the Australian model that had been implemented during the 
Labor years of the war.424 His promotion of this at the United Nations extended the 
reach of Australian influence both by adopting this policy, and by promoting it 
through the trusteeship system. The pursuit of security was achieved in the Pacific by 
granting Australia trusteeship over Papua and New Guinea.425 By promoting strong 
socio-economic and democratic policies, Evatt hoped to avoid the risk of conflict and 
colonial dispute that had destabilized Indonesia.426 Yet the Australian trusteeship of 
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Papua and New Guinea also offered the opportunity to exercise influence over the 
Pacific region, alleviating threats and encouraging strong relations with the regional 
power.427 Evatt’s promotion of social justice through the trusteeship system expanded 
Australia’s post-war opportunities for influence in the Pacific. 428  Social justice 
therefore served to offer security and the extension of Australian interests in the post-
war system. 
 
Evatt’s most notable deviation from any professed human rights vision occurred in his 
subscription to the White Australia Policy. This agenda revealed the realities of his 
racial ideology, strongly influenced by Australia’s colonial and Dominion heritage 
and domestic social concerns.429 The racial ideology that influenced the imposition of 
the White Australia Policy in the 1940’s was largely shaped by the Australian colonial 
heritage and the contemporary demands of the mid twentieth century. 430 As a 
Dominion state, the Australian social and political culture was deeply shaped by the 
British colonial racial ideology. 431  Such an ideology considered white racial 
homogeneity to be a prerequisite to security and development.432 The Australian tenet 
of this racial ideology became increasingly influenced by anxieties over the ‘Yellow 
Peril’ and Japan in the Pacific, and economic concerns over employment and 
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stability.433 Particularly for Evatt, a scholar of Australia’s colonial and economic 
history, Asian immigration threatened the job security of white Australians.434 He 
strongly opposed free immigration and sought to restrict Asian immigration in order 
to protect white Australian jobs.435  
 
In order to ensure the continuation of this policy, Evatt undermined the efforts of 
human rights activists seeking supra-nationalism at the United Nations. Evatt sought 
to exercise a paternalistic racial ideology through the trusteeship system, allowing 
Australia to assist the self-government of the territories of Papua and New Guinea.436 
This agenda was shaped by Evatt’s belief in the impossibility of such native peoples 
achieving statehood without the assistance of greater, Dominion states.437 Evatt also 
undermined the human rights movement by strengthening the clauses in the Charter 
relating to domestic jurisdiction.438 Originally, Evatt supported the weakening of 
domestic jurisdiction in the hopes of increasing Australia’s international influence.439 
Upon realizing that this would threaten his domestic immigration policies, Evatt 
vehemently opposed the penetration of national sovereignty.440 Evatt acted tirelessly 
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to ensure that domestic immigration policies were exempt from international scrutiny 
at the United Nations.441  
 
This agenda was then furthered as he supported South Africa in their claim that 
apartheid and their treatment of South West Africa was a domestic matter over which 
the international community had no authority.442 Evatt repeatedly rejected proposals 
to bring human rights allegations against South Africa’s domestic policies to the 
international community, asserting the impenetrability of the nation-state.443 Evatt 
also abstained from voting on Palestine for fear of establishing a precedent of 
international intervention in domestic affairs. 444  This agenda most clearly 
demonstrates how Evatt’s nationalism superseded his professed universalist human 
rights vision. Ultimately, the pursuit of Australian interests was Evatt’s first priority 
and thus the realization of human rights was often undermined.  
 
Despite Herbert Evatt’s involvement in the 1940’s human rights movement, a critical 
study of his career demonstrates that his central agenda was not the pursuit of 
universalism but the expansion of Australia’s post-war opportunities. This agenda 
often undermined the realization of post-war human rights as Evatt sought to 
construct the post-war system in such a way as to buttress Australia’s international 
position. His small state strategy, pursuit of social justice and defense of the White 
Australia Policy demonstrate the centrality of this agenda. Human rights in the 1940’s 
therefore offered to Evatt an opportunity to extend Australia’s post-war influences 
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and mitigate the recreation of an unchecked great state system. When considering 
Evatt’s career within historical debates over the 1940’s human rights moment, a 
number of conclusions are clear. Evatt’s pursuit of national projects reinforces the 
criticisms of Moyn, Mazower and their contemporaries who consider the post-war 
reconstructive effort that resulted in the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights to be the recreation of pre-existing ideas and structures, not the 
creation of a new universal human rights regime. Evatt’s international activism sought 
to extend his pre-existing national agenda and better the Australian position, often 
undermining or manipulating human rights policies in this pursuit. The 1940’s human 
rights moment must therefore be considered critically, as Evatt’s career demonstrates 
the paramount influence that personal and domestic agendas had on the formation of 
the post-war human rights regime. One must consider, therefore, whether the 
construction of an international human rights regime was a genuine end in itself or the 
vehicle by which national activists pursued post-war advantage. 
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